First of all, if you consider the possibility of getting caught, you are mixing pure Utilitarianism with a little bit of Consequentialism. This begs the question: why consider only the possibility of getting caught, that is the utility of the first consequence of the act? To achieve Eudaimonia, shouldn’t you consider all the consequences of your actions? What if getting caught has a second consequences the fact that the couple split, and the wronged wife finds a better man?
Secondly, you cannot retreat to 0.5 probability for getting caught. The probability of getting caught is as anything dependent on the prior probability. In the case of no information is 0.5, but what if you have strong reason to believe you won’t get caught? There is no default value for a probability.
Thirdly (is that a word?), the numbers plugged into the matrix seems very ad hoc. What if the utility for the uncoupled member is 35 or 50?
Eudaimonic Utilitarianism, as presented here, shows that Adultery is immoral only because you plugged in the right numbers to make it so.
Um, I was under the understanding that Utilitarianism is a subset of Consequentialism.
For simplicity’s sake I only considered the first consequences because it is very difficult to be certain that second consequences such as “the couple split, and the wronged wife finds a better man” will actually occur. Obviously if you can somehow reliably compute those possibilities, then by all means.
The 0.5 is based on the Principle of Indifference (also known as the Principle of Insufficient Reason) and the Principle of Maximum Entropy. It may not be proper, but these principles at least suggest a default probability given high uncertainty. I admit that they are very preliminary efforts, and that there may be a better prior. For the most part, I’m just trying to show the difference between Classical Utilitarianism which might in some circumstances allow for Adultery being moral, and Eudaimonic Utilitarianism, which shows it is generally not moral.
Thirdly is a word yes.
The numbers plugged into the matrix are based on my own intuitions of the relative effects of Adultery. The absolute values are not really important. It’s the relative difference between the effects that matters. I think anyone will agree that the fleeting pleasures of an affair are not greater in value than the fallout of losing a partner. I assumed that the fallout was four times worse than the affair was good. Admittedly this is an ad hoc assumption and can be argued. But whatever numbers you plug into the equations, as long as the damage from the fallout is at least twice as worse than the pleasure of the affair (which I think is a fair assumption given the long term nature of the fallout compared to the fleeting nature of the affair), it always comes out as morally wrong in Eudaimonic Utilitarianism.
Three observations on the Adultery problem.
First of all, if you consider the possibility of getting caught, you are mixing pure Utilitarianism with a little bit of Consequentialism. This begs the question: why consider only the possibility of getting caught, that is the utility of the first consequence of the act? To achieve Eudaimonia, shouldn’t you consider all the consequences of your actions? What if getting caught has a second consequences the fact that the couple split, and the wronged wife finds a better man?
Secondly, you cannot retreat to 0.5 probability for getting caught. The probability of getting caught is as anything dependent on the prior probability. In the case of no information is 0.5, but what if you have strong reason to believe you won’t get caught? There is no default value for a probability.
Thirdly (is that a word?), the numbers plugged into the matrix seems very ad hoc. What if the utility for the uncoupled member is 35 or 50?
Eudaimonic Utilitarianism, as presented here, shows that Adultery is immoral only because you plugged in the right numbers to make it so.
Um, I was under the understanding that Utilitarianism is a subset of Consequentialism.
For simplicity’s sake I only considered the first consequences because it is very difficult to be certain that second consequences such as “the couple split, and the wronged wife finds a better man” will actually occur. Obviously if you can somehow reliably compute those possibilities, then by all means.
The 0.5 is based on the Principle of Indifference (also known as the Principle of Insufficient Reason) and the Principle of Maximum Entropy. It may not be proper, but these principles at least suggest a default probability given high uncertainty. I admit that they are very preliminary efforts, and that there may be a better prior. For the most part, I’m just trying to show the difference between Classical Utilitarianism which might in some circumstances allow for Adultery being moral, and Eudaimonic Utilitarianism, which shows it is generally not moral.
Thirdly is a word yes.
The numbers plugged into the matrix are based on my own intuitions of the relative effects of Adultery. The absolute values are not really important. It’s the relative difference between the effects that matters. I think anyone will agree that the fleeting pleasures of an affair are not greater in value than the fallout of losing a partner. I assumed that the fallout was four times worse than the affair was good. Admittedly this is an ad hoc assumption and can be argued. But whatever numbers you plug into the equations, as long as the damage from the fallout is at least twice as worse than the pleasure of the affair (which I think is a fair assumption given the long term nature of the fallout compared to the fleeting nature of the affair), it always comes out as morally wrong in Eudaimonic Utilitarianism.