If you don’t say that only conscious agents can collapse waveforms, then you have to agree that something in the box collapses the waveform as seen from inside the box, while it’s still uncollapsed to Schroedinger.
I don’t understand this claim. If I think collapse can occur without conscious observation (say by the interaction of microscopic and macroscopic systems, however that distinction may be drawn, or by some spontaneous dynamical process) why would I have to agree that the waveform is still uncollapsed to Schroedinger? You seem to be assuming here that Schroedinger’s epistemic state is relevant to whether or not the waveform is collapsed to him, but I thought the whole point of this option was to render Schroedinger’s epistemic state (and, indeed, his status as a conscious agent) irrelevant to the situation.
The idea of the non-collapsed waveform is that there are two systems that haven’t interacted; and each is indeterminate to the other until they interact.
But you can have any number of nested systems, each of which may or may not have interacted with the system it is contained in. If the cat in the box can be in an indeterminate state to Schroedinger, then Schroedinger and the cat can be in an indeterminate state to someone out in the hallway. Whether Schroedinger has opened the box or not.
The Copenhagen interpretation doesn’t admit of the possibility that every waveform is either collapsed or not collapsed. If that were the case, every atom’s waveform would always collapse as soon as it interacted with another atom!
It can only be collapsed with respect to some observer. UNLESS you make the stipulation that only very special observers, like conscious agents, can collapse a waveform.
Here is how I interpret your claim here: The only way the Copenhagen interpretation could be an absolute state theory—i.e. a theory where the quantum state of a system is absolute, not relative to some other system—is for collapse to be caused by conscious agents. Am I misinterpreting you?
If I’m not, I don’t see why you believe this. The Copenhagen interpretation does say that a certain class of interactions—measurement interactions—produce collapse. And I acknowledge that it cannot maintain that all physical interactions are measurement interactions. That view has been conclusively refuted empirically. However, why think that the only alternative is that measurement interactions must involve conscious observation? Bohr, as far as I can tell from his mysterious proclamations on the topic, seemed to think that any interaction with a macroscopic system is a measurement interaction. He didn’t think that consciousness played any essential role in his interpretation. I think Wigner was the one who emphasized consciousness.
Now you could say that Bohr’s interpretation is untenable, since microscopic/macroscopic is a continuum, not a binary distinction. Also, macroscopic systems are just built out of microscopic systems, so why think the measurement problem doesn’t apply to them? I agree! But the exact same criticisms can be raised about consciousness, so Wigner’s interpretation is not on sounder footing here. So I guess I’m not seeing why you think a Wigner-type delineation of measurement interactions is the only way to avoid Copenhagen collapsing into Everett.
Here is how I interpret your claim here: The only way the Copenhagen interpretation could be an absolute state theory—i.e. a theory where the quantum state of a system is absolute, not relative to some other system—is for collapse to be caused by conscious agents. Am I misinterpreting you?
You got it! Thank you!
If I’m not, I don’t see why you believe this. The Copenhagen interpretation does say that a certain class of interactions—measurement interactions—produce collapse. And I acknowledge that it cannot maintain that all physical interactions are measurement interactions. That view has been conclusively refuted empirically. However, why think that the only alternative is that measurement interactions must involve conscious observation? Bohr, as far as I can tell from his mysterious proclamations on the topic, seemed to think that any interaction with a macroscopic system is a measurement interaction.
There might be some other type of measurement, not involving consciousness, that would occur rarely enough to work. I’m just not aware of any.
I don’t understand this claim. If I think collapse can occur without conscious observation (say by the interaction of microscopic and macroscopic systems, however that distinction may be drawn, or by some spontaneous dynamical process) why would I have to agree that the waveform is still uncollapsed to Schroedinger? You seem to be assuming here that Schroedinger’s epistemic state is relevant to whether or not the waveform is collapsed to him, but I thought the whole point of this option was to render Schroedinger’s epistemic state (and, indeed, his status as a conscious agent) irrelevant to the situation.
The idea of the non-collapsed waveform is that there are two systems that haven’t interacted; and each is indeterminate to the other until they interact.
But you can have any number of nested systems, each of which may or may not have interacted with the system it is contained in. If the cat in the box can be in an indeterminate state to Schroedinger, then Schroedinger and the cat can be in an indeterminate state to someone out in the hallway. Whether Schroedinger has opened the box or not.
The Copenhagen interpretation doesn’t admit of the possibility that every waveform is either collapsed or not collapsed. If that were the case, every atom’s waveform would always collapse as soon as it interacted with another atom!
It can only be collapsed with respect to some observer. UNLESS you make the stipulation that only very special observers, like conscious agents, can collapse a waveform.
Here is how I interpret your claim here: The only way the Copenhagen interpretation could be an absolute state theory—i.e. a theory where the quantum state of a system is absolute, not relative to some other system—is for collapse to be caused by conscious agents. Am I misinterpreting you?
If I’m not, I don’t see why you believe this. The Copenhagen interpretation does say that a certain class of interactions—measurement interactions—produce collapse. And I acknowledge that it cannot maintain that all physical interactions are measurement interactions. That view has been conclusively refuted empirically. However, why think that the only alternative is that measurement interactions must involve conscious observation? Bohr, as far as I can tell from his mysterious proclamations on the topic, seemed to think that any interaction with a macroscopic system is a measurement interaction. He didn’t think that consciousness played any essential role in his interpretation. I think Wigner was the one who emphasized consciousness.
Now you could say that Bohr’s interpretation is untenable, since microscopic/macroscopic is a continuum, not a binary distinction. Also, macroscopic systems are just built out of microscopic systems, so why think the measurement problem doesn’t apply to them? I agree! But the exact same criticisms can be raised about consciousness, so Wigner’s interpretation is not on sounder footing here. So I guess I’m not seeing why you think a Wigner-type delineation of measurement interactions is the only way to avoid Copenhagen collapsing into Everett.
You got it! Thank you!
There might be some other type of measurement, not involving consciousness, that would occur rarely enough to work. I’m just not aware of any.