Perhaps all variation in certainty favouring is simply due to environmental factors. Remember that all complex adaptions must be universal so there must be a simple difference, something like single gene present or absent, which controls how much someone desires certainty for any of the variance to be genetic.
Even if some is genetic, I would guess that the primary difference is in which side of the system1 vs system 2 dichotomy is more likely to win. This affects lots of things other than certainty bias, and so may have been kept where it is by many other factors, with the last being an unfortunate side effect of the general way in which system 1 works (in particular, that system 1 seems bad at expressing nuances and continuous ranges, it sees the world almost entirely in good vs bad dichotomies).
Certainly there are no true expected utility maximisers out there, so it is no surprise that we should violate expected utility maximisation in some way.
Even having said that, if you demand an explanation the one I just gave still seems reasonably good.
Remember that all complex adaptions must be universal so there must be a simple difference, something like single gene present or absent, which controls how much someone desires certainty for any of the variance to be genetic.
This doesn’t appear to be the case for genetic variation in intelligence. (Also, I don’t see how it follows in the first place.)
Any complex adaptation, requiring many genes to work together, cannot all evolve at once, it would be too unlikely a mutation. Instead, pieces evolve one by one, each individually useful in the context they first appear. However, there is not enough selection pressure to evolve a new piece unless the old pieces are already universal, so you would not expect anything complicated to exist in some but not all members of a species.
With intelligence, it seems like many different factors can affect it on the margins, because the brain is a complex organ that can be slowed down, sped up or damaged in many ways. However, I do not notice a particularly wide intelligence spread among humans, only in rare cases where something is genuinely broken do we find someone less intelligent than a chimpanzee, and we literally never find someone more intelligent by an equivalent amount.
Any complex adaptation, requiring many genes to work together, cannot all evolve at once, it would be too unlikely a mutation. Instead, pieces evolve one by one, each individually useful in the context they first appear. However, there is not enough selection pressure to evolve a new piece unless the old pieces are already universal, so you would not expect anything complicated to exist in some but not all members of a species.
I get that. I don’t see how that could imply that quantitative variation must be controlled by a single gene.
I also don’t see how the magnitude of variation in intelligence affects the argument (“particularly wide intelligence spread” is subjective).
It doesn’t quite have to be controlled by a single gene, I was giving an example. Something like height, which is affected by many factors, could be affected by lots of single gene substitutions, but you would expect the over-all effect to look like an averaging out, not like some humans having one set of decision making machinery and others having a totally different set.
Perhaps all variation in certainty favouring is simply due to environmental factors.
Could very well be.
Even having said that, if you demand an explanation the one I just gave still seems reasonably good.
Yes, it does. I prefer the one paulfchristiano made, since it applies to a wider range of circumstances (interpersonal and environmental), but the untrustworthy agent explanation works well enough.
Perhaps all variation in certainty favouring is simply due to environmental factors. Remember that all complex adaptions must be universal so there must be a simple difference, something like single gene present or absent, which controls how much someone desires certainty for any of the variance to be genetic.
Even if some is genetic, I would guess that the primary difference is in which side of the system1 vs system 2 dichotomy is more likely to win. This affects lots of things other than certainty bias, and so may have been kept where it is by many other factors, with the last being an unfortunate side effect of the general way in which system 1 works (in particular, that system 1 seems bad at expressing nuances and continuous ranges, it sees the world almost entirely in good vs bad dichotomies).
Certainly there are no true expected utility maximisers out there, so it is no surprise that we should violate expected utility maximisation in some way.
Even having said that, if you demand an explanation the one I just gave still seems reasonably good.
This doesn’t appear to be the case for genetic variation in intelligence. (Also, I don’t see how it follows in the first place.)
Any complex adaptation, requiring many genes to work together, cannot all evolve at once, it would be too unlikely a mutation. Instead, pieces evolve one by one, each individually useful in the context they first appear. However, there is not enough selection pressure to evolve a new piece unless the old pieces are already universal, so you would not expect anything complicated to exist in some but not all members of a species.
With intelligence, it seems like many different factors can affect it on the margins, because the brain is a complex organ that can be slowed down, sped up or damaged in many ways. However, I do not notice a particularly wide intelligence spread among humans, only in rare cases where something is genuinely broken do we find someone less intelligent than a chimpanzee, and we literally never find someone more intelligent by an equivalent amount.
I get that. I don’t see how that could imply that quantitative variation must be controlled by a single gene.
I also don’t see how the magnitude of variation in intelligence affects the argument (“particularly wide intelligence spread” is subjective).
It doesn’t quite have to be controlled by a single gene, I was giving an example. Something like height, which is affected by many factors, could be affected by lots of single gene substitutions, but you would expect the over-all effect to look like an averaging out, not like some humans having one set of decision making machinery and others having a totally different set.
Could very well be.
Yes, it does. I prefer the one paulfchristiano made, since it applies to a wider range of circumstances (interpersonal and environmental), but the untrustworthy agent explanation works well enough.