I think Benacerraf’s epistemological argument just is a knockdown against almost any form of platonism to me. You don’t have to agree because I think at this level of metaphysics there’s a lot of intuitions dominating, but for me it makes platonism entirely implausible. I’m not too decided on ontological status right now, maybe I’m some sort of eliminative structuralist or something? But I could be moved. Obviously when I do maths I act as though I’m a platonist and when I talk about morality I act as though I’m a realist, but in both cases I am not.
But yes, I think probably most of the debates between e.g. Woodin, Hamkins, etc about pluralism/non-pluralism are for the most part better thought of as methodological debates with a philosophical undercurrent.
I think Benacerraf’s epistemological argument just is a knockdown against almost any form of platonism to me. You don’t have to agree because I think at this level of metaphysics there’s a lot of intuitions dominating, but for me it makes platonism entirely implausible. I’m not too decided on ontological status right now, maybe I’m some sort of eliminative structuralist or something? But I could be moved. Obviously when I do maths I act as though I’m a platonist and when I talk about morality I act as though I’m a realist, but in both cases I am not.
But yes, I think probably most of the debates between e.g. Woodin, Hamkins, etc about pluralism/non-pluralism are for the most part better thought of as methodological debates with a philosophical undercurrent.