My best guess is that you are saying that I moved the discussion from the question of the fact of ethical unity of humankind, to the question of whether we should adopt a belief in the ethical unity of humankind.
Correct.
I state that the ethical diversity is less than the currently observed behavioral diversity.
I agree, and agree that the argument form you paraphrase is fallacious.
To this I reply with “If you can’t be wrong, you can never get better.” This is not an endorsement to self-deceivingly “believe” that you can be wrong, but an argument for it being a mistake to believe that you can never be morally wrong, if it’s possible to get better.
Are you saying you were using modus tollens – you can get better (presumed to be accepted by all involved), therefore you can be wrong? This wasn’t clear, especially since you agreed that it’s an appeal to consequences.
Are you saying you were using modus tollens – you can get better (presumed to be accepted by all involved), therefore you can be wrong? This wasn’t clear, especially since you agreed that it’s an appeal to consequences.
Right. Since I consider epistemic rationality, as any other tool, an arrangement that brings about what I prefer, in itself or instrumentally, I didn’t see “appeal to consequences” of a belief sufficiently distinct from desire to ensure the truth of the belief.
Correct.
I agree, and agree that the argument form you paraphrase is fallacious.
Are you saying you were using modus tollens – you can get better (presumed to be accepted by all involved), therefore you can be wrong? This wasn’t clear, especially since you agreed that it’s an appeal to consequences.
Right. Since I consider epistemic rationality, as any other tool, an arrangement that brings about what I prefer, in itself or instrumentally, I didn’t see “appeal to consequences” of a belief sufficiently distinct from desire to ensure the truth of the belief.