I missed this post when it came out and just came across it. Re “Logical Induction as Metaphilosophy” I have the same objection that I recently made against “reflective equilibrium”:
Another argument against this form of reflective equilibrium is that it seems to imply anti-realism about normative decision theory, given differing intuitions between people. I think this is plausible but not likely, so it seems bad to bake it into our methodology of doing decision theory.
In other words, in Logical Induction as Metaphilosophy there seems to be nothing grounding one’s ultimate philosophical conclusions except the intuitions that one started with (unlike its application in math where there are proofs), so different people with different intuitions seem destined to reach different conclusions, even on topics that seemingly ought to have objective answers, like decision theory, metaethics, philosophy of consciousness, and metaphilosophy itself.
I missed this post when it came out and just came across it. Re “Logical Induction as Metaphilosophy” I have the same objection that I recently made against “reflective equilibrium”:
In other words, in Logical Induction as Metaphilosophy there seems to be nothing grounding one’s ultimate philosophical conclusions except the intuitions that one started with (unlike its application in math where there are proofs), so different people with different intuitions seem destined to reach different conclusions, even on topics that seemingly ought to have objective answers, like decision theory, metaethics, philosophy of consciousness, and metaphilosophy itself.