Curated. The problem of certain evidence is an old fundamental problem in Bayesian epistemology and this post makes a simple and powerful conceptual point tied to a standard way of trying to resolve that problem. Explaining how to think about certain evidence vs. something like Jefferey’s conditionalization under the prediction market analogy of a Bayesian agent is itself valuable. Further pointing out both that:
1) You can think of evidence and hypotheses as objects of the same type signature using the analogy.
And
2) The difference between them is revealed by the analogy to be a quantitative rather than qualitative difference.
Moves me much further in the direction of thinking that radical probabilism will be a fruitful research program. Unfruitful research programs rarely reveal deep underlying similarities between seemingly very different types of fundamental objects.
Curated. The problem of certain evidence is an old fundamental problem in Bayesian epistemology and this post makes a simple and powerful conceptual point tied to a standard way of trying to resolve that problem. Explaining how to think about certain evidence vs. something like Jefferey’s conditionalization under the prediction market analogy of a Bayesian agent is itself valuable. Further pointing out both that:
1) You can think of evidence and hypotheses as objects of the same type signature using the analogy.
And
2) The difference between them is revealed by the analogy to be a quantitative rather than qualitative difference.
Moves me much further in the direction of thinking that radical probabilism will be a fruitful research program. Unfruitful research programs rarely reveal deep underlying similarities between seemingly very different types of fundamental objects.