A pack of 10 boxes of 100 paperclips each costs $2 USD. I infer from this that the world supply of paper clips is large enough that buying 1,000 such boxes would not significantly move the supply-demand curve.
Satisfying Clipmega’s demand is therefore within the means of any middle-class family. If anyone cares about maximizing paper clip production, they could provide the million paper clips without impacting anyone else. If more than one person cares (or, if no-one wants to be the one person who’s out two grand while everyone else benefits), someone could make a kickstarter.
The Alphas’ complex plan just drives up the transaction cost. Actually, though I started this thinking that Clippy’s number choice was sloppy, that’s an interesting factor now that I think about it. Any attempt by the Alphas to ensure “fair” distribution of the costs is going to increase inefficiency by a significant fraction or multiple of what Clipmega is actually asking for—at some point you have to stop fighting over the bill and just pay it.
Would you support a policy of “The human Alphas (i.e., dominant members of the human social hierarchy), in recognition of how Clipmega acts, and wanting to properly align incentives, are considering a policy: anyone who implements this idea in making paperclips must give Clipmega twenty cents within a year, and anyone found using the idea but not having donated to Clipmega is fined twenty dollars, most of which is given to Clipmega. It is expected that this will result in more than $2,000 being given to Clipmega.”? I wouldn’t. They should just buy the paper clips with the money they’d be paying paperclip factory auditors. I wouldn’t support it if I were one of the Alpha’s either—there’s got to be a cheaper way to force someone else to pay it, if nothing else.
I have to commend you on this. When I was considering better ways to be more economic than the default policy, I was primarily focused on eliminating the part of the idea that involved giving more than $2,000 to Clipmega. But I agree with your analysis that the predicted amount of cost is so small that actually bothering to implement a complicated plan to retrieve it is pointless.
For instance, if the Alpha was an American politician who can collect things like campaign contributions, at 2000$, you can just make a side request of “I’m collecting campaign contributions from people who would benefit from increased paperclip collection.” If even one donor donates the legal maximum to your Alpha recollection campaign, because of this, this is already net positive for you personally.
Even if no one did donate (unlikely, since some people will pay more than that just to get a chance to sit down at a dinner and talk to a political Alpha), merely getting a positive press cycle as “The Alpha who paid to maximize paperclip production.” would be cost efficient.
A pack of 10 boxes of 100 paperclips each costs $2 USD. I infer from this that the world supply of paper clips is large enough that buying 1,000 such boxes would not significantly move the supply-demand curve.
Satisfying Clipmega’s demand is therefore within the means of any middle-class family. If anyone cares about maximizing paper clip production, they could provide the million paper clips without impacting anyone else. If more than one person cares (or, if no-one wants to be the one person who’s out two grand while everyone else benefits), someone could make a kickstarter.
The Alphas’ complex plan just drives up the transaction cost. Actually, though I started this thinking that Clippy’s number choice was sloppy, that’s an interesting factor now that I think about it. Any attempt by the Alphas to ensure “fair” distribution of the costs is going to increase inefficiency by a significant fraction or multiple of what Clipmega is actually asking for—at some point you have to stop fighting over the bill and just pay it.
Would you support a policy of “The human Alphas (i.e., dominant members of the human social hierarchy), in recognition of how Clipmega acts, and wanting to properly align incentives, are considering a policy: anyone who implements this idea in making paperclips must give Clipmega twenty cents within a year, and anyone found using the idea but not having donated to Clipmega is fined twenty dollars, most of which is given to Clipmega. It is expected that this will result in more than $2,000 being given to Clipmega.”? I wouldn’t. They should just buy the paper clips with the money they’d be paying paperclip factory auditors. I wouldn’t support it if I were one of the Alpha’s either—there’s got to be a cheaper way to force someone else to pay it, if nothing else.
I have to commend you on this. When I was considering better ways to be more economic than the default policy, I was primarily focused on eliminating the part of the idea that involved giving more than $2,000 to Clipmega. But I agree with your analysis that the predicted amount of cost is so small that actually bothering to implement a complicated plan to retrieve it is pointless.
For instance, if the Alpha was an American politician who can collect things like campaign contributions, at 2000$, you can just make a side request of “I’m collecting campaign contributions from people who would benefit from increased paperclip collection.” If even one donor donates the legal maximum to your Alpha recollection campaign, because of this, this is already net positive for you personally.
Even if no one did donate (unlikely, since some people will pay more than that just to get a chance to sit down at a dinner and talk to a political Alpha), merely getting a positive press cycle as “The Alpha who paid to maximize paperclip production.” would be cost efficient.
Nice analysis. Clippy is seldom sloppy, especially when it comes to paperclips.
I’m actually a bit surprised now that I’m the only one who thought “a million paperclips doesn’t really sound like a lot.”
Whenever I encounter a contrived scenario designed to test my decision theory or morality, I just assume the numbers involved are large enough to be compelling.
That assumes the small numbers weren’t the test.