Concerning preferences, what else is part of morality besides preferences?
“Inseparably Right” discusses that a bit, though again, I don’t recommend reading it out of order.
What is debated is whether anything else can justify should or ought statements. Can categorical imperatives justify ought statements? Can divine commands do so? Can non-natural moral facts? Can intrinsic value? And if so, why is it that these things are sources of normativity but not, say, facts about which arrangements of marbles resemble Penelope Cruz when viewed from afar?
These stand out to me as wrong questions. I think the sequence mostly succeeded at dissolving them for me; “Invisible Frameworks” is probably the most focused discussion of that.
I do take some confort in the fact that at least at this point, even pros like Robin Hanson and Toby Ord couldn’t make sense of what Eliezer was arguing, even after several rounds of back-and-forth between them.
“Inseparably Right” discusses that a bit, though again, I don’t recommend reading it out of order.
These stand out to me as wrong questions. I think the sequence mostly succeeded at dissolving them for me; “Invisible Frameworks” is probably the most focused discussion of that.
I do take some confort in the fact that at least at this point, even pros like Robin Hanson and Toby Ord couldn’t make sense of what Eliezer was arguing, even after several rounds of back-and-forth between them.
But I’ll keep trying.