The point was that it is rational to cooperate even though you are weeping. The explanation is given in the previous post.
I am far from convinced that superrationality applies between you or me and humans in general, let alone humans with epistemic processes that permit them to be creationists. At least, it’s obvious that my decision process is not correlated in any relevant sense with that of someone who hasn’t heard/thought of or doesn’t subscribe to superrationality.
Keep in mind, this creationist, despite his epistemic problems, has manages so far not to die from believing that “when they drink deadly poison, it will not hurt them at all”. Maybe he has some rationality you can work with, maybe even enough that he thinks that saving an extra billion lives is worth cooperating with an atheist (so long as the atheist is likewise rational enough to save an extra billion lives by cooperating with a creationist).
Keep in mind, this creationist, despite his epistemic problems, has manages so far not to die from believing that “when they drink deadly poison, it will not hurt them at all”.
Not killing yourself in such grossly obvious ways is pretty easy (very few people, even creationists, let their abstract beliefs control their actions that much), and doesn’t seem at all relevant to me.
maybe even enough that he thinks that saving an extra billion lives is worth cooperating with an atheist
I’m sure he already thinks that, not being an alien monster and all – his problem is epistemic, not moral.
(so long as the atheist is likewise rational enough to save an extra billion lives by cooperating with a creationist)
So long as the creationist thinks that, you mean. Again, he’s almost certainly not aware of superrationality, so I should persuade him to cooperate however I can, then defect. (Modulo the possibility that privately precommitting to cooperate could make me more persuasive, but on casual introspection I doubt I could actually do that.)
In the unlikely event the creationist is superrational, I expect we’d both start out trying to persuade each other, so we could notice the symmetry, mutually determine that we’re superrational (since causal decision theorists could also start out persuading), and both cooperate (resulting in a worse outcome than if he hadn’t been superrational).
Not killing yourself in such grossly obvious ways is pretty easy (very few people, even creationists, let their abstract beliefs control their actions that much), and doesn’t seem at all relevant to me.
You seriously think that the fact that the creationist doesn’t let his abstract belief control his actions is not relevant to the question of whether he will let his abstract belief control his actions? The point is, he has ways of overcoming the foolishness of his beliefs when faced with an important problem.
I’m sure he already thinks that, not being an alien monster and all
So, if you agree he would be willing to cooperate with an atheist, why would he not cooperate by exchanging his choice for the higher payoff in the event that the atheist is right for the atheist’s choice for the higher payoff in the event the creationist is right? Recognizing a Pareto improvement is not hard even if one has never heard of Pareto.
In the unlikely event the creationist is superrational …
It seems you are prepared to recognize this. Are you also prepared to recognize that he did not start out superrational, but is persuaded by your arguments?
You seriously think that the fact that the creationist doesn’t let his abstract belief control his actions is not relevant to the question of whether he will let his abstract belief control his actions?
I think that the fact that he doesn’t let his abstract belief cause him to drink poison, when everyone around him with the same abstract belief obviously doesn’t drink poison, when common sense (poison is bad for you) opposes the abstract belief, and when the relevant abstract belief probably occupies very little space in his mind* is of little relevance to whether he will let an abstract belief that is highly salient and part of his identity make him act in a way that isn’t nonconforming and doesn’t conflict with common sense.
*If any; plenty of polls show Christians to be shockingly ignorant of the Bible, something many atheists seem to be unaware of.
So, if you agree he would be willing to cooperate with an atheist, why would he not cooperate by exchanging his choice for the higher payoff in the event that the atheist is right for the atheist’s choice for the higher payoff in the event the creationist is right? Recognizing a Pareto improvement is not hard even if one has never heard of Pareto.
No doubt he would, which is why I would try to persuade him, but he is not capable of discerning what action I’ll take (modulo imperfect deception on my part, but again I seriously doubt I could do better by internally committing), nor is his decision process correlated with mine.
It seems you are prepared to recognize this. Are you also prepared to recognize that he did not start out superrational, but is persuaded by your arguments?
I would rather persuade him to cooperate but not to be superrational (allowing the outcome to be D/C) than persuade him to be superrational (forcing C/C), and I doubt the latter would be easier.
(Caveat: I’m not entirely sure about the case where the creationist is not superrational, but knows me very well.)
The creationist does not have to contradict his belief about the age of the earth to cooperate. He only needs to recognize that the way to get the best result given his belief is to exchange cooperation for cooperation, using common sense (saving 2 billion people given that the earth is young is better than saving 1 billion people given that the earth is young). Yes, understanding the prisoner’s dilemma is harder than understanding poison is bad, but it is still a case where common sense should overcome a small bias, if there is one at all. You might have some work to convince the creationist that his choice does not need to reflect his belief, just as your choice to cooperate would not indicate that you actually believe the earth is young.
I would rather persuade him to cooperate but not to be superrational (allowing the outcome to be D/C) than persuade him to be superrational (forcing C/C), and I doubt the latter would be easier.
Why is he going to cooperate unless you offer to cooperate in return? Unless you actually convinced him to reject young earth creationism, he would see that as saving 0 people instead of 1 billion. Or do you intend to trick him into believing that you would cooperate? I don’t think I could do that; I would have to be honest to be convincing.
I am far from convinced that superrationality applies between you or me and humans in general, let alone humans with epistemic processes that permit them to be creationists. At least, it’s obvious that my decision process is not correlated in any relevant sense with that of someone who hasn’t heard/thought of or doesn’t subscribe to superrationality.
Keep in mind, this creationist, despite his epistemic problems, has manages so far not to die from believing that “when they drink deadly poison, it will not hurt them at all”. Maybe he has some rationality you can work with, maybe even enough that he thinks that saving an extra billion lives is worth cooperating with an atheist (so long as the atheist is likewise rational enough to save an extra billion lives by cooperating with a creationist).
Not killing yourself in such grossly obvious ways is pretty easy (very few people, even creationists, let their abstract beliefs control their actions that much), and doesn’t seem at all relevant to me.
I’m sure he already thinks that, not being an alien monster and all – his problem is epistemic, not moral.
So long as the creationist thinks that, you mean. Again, he’s almost certainly not aware of superrationality, so I should persuade him to cooperate however I can, then defect. (Modulo the possibility that privately precommitting to cooperate could make me more persuasive, but on casual introspection I doubt I could actually do that.)
In the unlikely event the creationist is superrational, I expect we’d both start out trying to persuade each other, so we could notice the symmetry, mutually determine that we’re superrational (since causal decision theorists could also start out persuading), and both cooperate (resulting in a worse outcome than if he hadn’t been superrational).
You seriously think that the fact that the creationist doesn’t let his abstract belief control his actions is not relevant to the question of whether he will let his abstract belief control his actions? The point is, he has ways of overcoming the foolishness of his beliefs when faced with an important problem.
So, if you agree he would be willing to cooperate with an atheist, why would he not cooperate by exchanging his choice for the higher payoff in the event that the atheist is right for the atheist’s choice for the higher payoff in the event the creationist is right? Recognizing a Pareto improvement is not hard even if one has never heard of Pareto.
It seems you are prepared to recognize this. Are you also prepared to recognize that he did not start out superrational, but is persuaded by your arguments?
I think that the fact that he doesn’t let his abstract belief cause him to drink poison, when everyone around him with the same abstract belief obviously doesn’t drink poison, when common sense (poison is bad for you) opposes the abstract belief, and when the relevant abstract belief probably occupies very little space in his mind* is of little relevance to whether he will let an abstract belief that is highly salient and part of his identity make him act in a way that isn’t nonconforming and doesn’t conflict with common sense.
*If any; plenty of polls show Christians to be shockingly ignorant of the Bible, something many atheists seem to be unaware of.
No doubt he would, which is why I would try to persuade him, but he is not capable of discerning what action I’ll take (modulo imperfect deception on my part, but again I seriously doubt I could do better by internally committing), nor is his decision process correlated with mine.
I would rather persuade him to cooperate but not to be superrational (allowing the outcome to be D/C) than persuade him to be superrational (forcing C/C), and I doubt the latter would be easier.
(Caveat: I’m not entirely sure about the case where the creationist is not superrational, but knows me very well.)
The creationist does not have to contradict his belief about the age of the earth to cooperate. He only needs to recognize that the way to get the best result given his belief is to exchange cooperation for cooperation, using common sense (saving 2 billion people given that the earth is young is better than saving 1 billion people given that the earth is young). Yes, understanding the prisoner’s dilemma is harder than understanding poison is bad, but it is still a case where common sense should overcome a small bias, if there is one at all. You might have some work to convince the creationist that his choice does not need to reflect his belief, just as your choice to cooperate would not indicate that you actually believe the earth is young.
Why is he going to cooperate unless you offer to cooperate in return? Unless you actually convinced him to reject young earth creationism, he would see that as saving 0 people instead of 1 billion. Or do you intend to trick him into believing that you would cooperate? I don’t think I could do that; I would have to be honest to be convincing.
For those not familiar with superrationality, see http://www.gwern.net/docs/1985-hofstadter