I consider philosophy to be a study of human intuitions. Philosophy examines different ways to think about a variety of deep issues (morality, existence, etc.) and tries to resolve results that “feel wrong”.
On the other hand, I have very rarely heard it phrased this way. Often, philosophy is said to be reasoning directly about said issues (morality, existence, etc.), albeit with the help of human intuitions. This actually seems to be an underlying assumption of most philosophy discussions I’ve heard. I actually find that mildly disconcerting, given that I would expect it to confuse everyone involved with substantial frequency.
If anyone knows of a good argument for the assumption above, I would really like to hear it. I’ve only seen it assumed, never argued.
But obviously morality or existence is not a thing “out there” that we can just examine and see if they are red or blue, they are things in the mind. Mental constructs. Maps, if you like it that way. Ultimately, just words that mean something but that something is not a simple sensory input .Reifying them is pretty much an automatic fail.
So the investigation begins at the assumption that they are made by the mind, hence what we are trying to learn is how the mind makes them.
Philosophers may not admit it, but act as if they did: if a proposal leads to results we find absurd, it is abandoned. If we find nothing exists and we should eat babies, we abandon that line of thought because it did not do its job, it did not predict how we feel about things. What else could it be about if not the mind? If the mind finds something absurd, that is only relevant to truth if it is a truth about the mind. External physical reality is allowed to feel weird to our minds, it is only our minds themselves that not .
But obviously morality or existence is not a thing
Existence is not out there?
“out there” that we can just examine and see if they are red or blue, they are things in the mind. Mental constructs. Maps, if you like it that way. Ultimately, just words that mean something but that something is not a simple sensory input .Reifying them is pretty much an automatic fail.So the investigation begins at the assumption that they are made by the mind, hence what we are trying to learn is how the mind makes them.
Your conclusion doesnt follow. Treating mental processes as the last word on a subject is not the only alternative to reification …. rather it is an opposite extreme. There is a middle way, where you find out what your intuitions are murkilly grasping at, and then come out with an explicit, formal abstraction that does the same job better.
No, it is a highly abstract term. Very roughly, we make categories or classes of things based on our perceptions and then existence is looking at it from the other angle: does this class have an instance? But classes are in the mind.
Treating mental processes as the last word on a subject is not the only alternative to reification …. rather it is an opposite extreme. There is a middle way, where you find out what your intuitions are murkilly grasping at, and then come out with an explicit, formal abstraction that does the same job better.
You may be onto something here. Elaborate/example?
No, it is a highly abstract term. Very roughly, we make categories or classes of things based on our perceptions and then existence is looking at it from the other angle: does this class have an instance? But classes are in the mind.
Some people use “existence” to mean the some total of all that exists.
Treating mental processes as the last word on a subject is not the only alternative to reification …. rather it is an opposite extreme. There is a middle way, where you find out what your intuitions are murkilly grasping at, and then come out with an explicit, formal abstraction that does the same job better.You may be onto something here.
Elaborate/example?
That’s how we ended up with things like maths and logic. They are not just descriptions of human thought, they are norms in their own right: when an individual departs from the norm, we conclude that the individual is wrong, not that the description of human intuition has been falsified.
That’s how we ended up with things like maths and logic. They are not just descriptions of human thought, they are norms in their own right: when an individual departs from the norm, we conclude that the individual is wrong, not that the description of human intuition has been falsified.
But this then sounds like that math or logic is a “thing”, and then I must ask where that does thing reside? Either in physical reality out there, or in people’s minds.
If you simply define math as a symbol manipulation game, still the expected outcome is that not playing any game by the accepted norms is wrong, not that the game is wrong. Why this “game” then predicts reality surprisingly well, part of the answer is that only subsets of it do, as math as practiced by mathemathicians is far above and beyond what is usable for it by physics, and part of the answer is that because we simply like to study the kinds of things math happens to be useful for. If basic algebra is a formalization of the rules of a certain set of human intuitions and then every higher math is simply whatever is generated by those rules, this predicts precisely that it will be useful for some of the things we like to study, without it really being a “thing”.
But this then sounds like that math or logic is a “thing”, and then I must ask where that does thing reside? Either in physical reality out there, or in people’s minds.
It doesn’t have to be either or. You can learn maths from books, .ir record your knowledge in them.
Consider Vaniver on Harari on cultural artefacts:-
There are no gods in the universe, no nations, no money, no human rights, no laws, and no justice outside the common imagination of human beings.People easily understand that ‘primitives’ cement their social order by believing in ghosts and spirits, and gathering each full moon to dance together around the campfire.
What we fail to appreciate is that our modern institutions function on exactly the same basis.But, of course, those modern institutions (as well as the ‘primitive’ ones) function. One division Harari discusses that I found useful was objective, subjective, and inter-subjective:
An objective phenomenon exists independently of human consciousness and human beliefs. … [Radioactivity is his example.]The subjective is something that exists depending on the consciousness and beliefs of a single individual. … [A child’s imaginary friend is his example.]The inter-subjective is something that exists within the communication network linking the subjective consciousness of many individuals. If a single individual changes his or her beliefs, or even dies, it is of little importance. However, if most individuals in the network die or change their beliefs, the inter-subjective phenomenon will mutate or disappear. …Many of history’s most important drivers are inter-subjective: law, money, gods, nations.
I consider philosophy to be a study of human intuitions. Philosophy examines different ways to think about a variety of deep issues (morality, existence, etc.) and tries to resolve results that “feel wrong”.
On the other hand, I have very rarely heard it phrased this way. Often, philosophy is said to be reasoning directly about said issues (morality, existence, etc.), albeit with the help of human intuitions. This actually seems to be an underlying assumption of most philosophy discussions I’ve heard. I actually find that mildly disconcerting, given that I would expect it to confuse everyone involved with substantial frequency.
If anyone knows of a good argument for the assumption above, I would really like to hear it. I’ve only seen it assumed, never argued.
But obviously morality or existence is not a thing “out there” that we can just examine and see if they are red or blue, they are things in the mind. Mental constructs. Maps, if you like it that way. Ultimately, just words that mean something but that something is not a simple sensory input .Reifying them is pretty much an automatic fail.
So the investigation begins at the assumption that they are made by the mind, hence what we are trying to learn is how the mind makes them.
Philosophers may not admit it, but act as if they did: if a proposal leads to results we find absurd, it is abandoned. If we find nothing exists and we should eat babies, we abandon that line of thought because it did not do its job, it did not predict how we feel about things. What else could it be about if not the mind? If the mind finds something absurd, that is only relevant to truth if it is a truth about the mind. External physical reality is allowed to feel weird to our minds, it is only our minds themselves that not .
Existence is not out there?
Your conclusion doesnt follow. Treating mental processes as the last word on a subject is not the only alternative to reification …. rather it is an opposite extreme. There is a middle way, where you find out what your intuitions are murkilly grasping at, and then come out with an explicit, formal abstraction that does the same job better.
No, it is a highly abstract term. Very roughly, we make categories or classes of things based on our perceptions and then existence is looking at it from the other angle: does this class have an instance? But classes are in the mind.
You may be onto something here. Elaborate/example?
Some people use “existence” to mean the some total of all that exists.
That’s how we ended up with things like maths and logic. They are not just descriptions of human thought, they are norms in their own right: when an individual departs from the norm, we conclude that the individual is wrong, not that the description of human intuition has been falsified.
But this then sounds like that math or logic is a “thing”, and then I must ask where that does thing reside? Either in physical reality out there, or in people’s minds.
If you simply define math as a symbol manipulation game, still the expected outcome is that not playing any game by the accepted norms is wrong, not that the game is wrong. Why this “game” then predicts reality surprisingly well, part of the answer is that only subsets of it do, as math as practiced by mathemathicians is far above and beyond what is usable for it by physics, and part of the answer is that because we simply like to study the kinds of things math happens to be useful for. If basic algebra is a formalization of the rules of a certain set of human intuitions and then every higher math is simply whatever is generated by those rules, this predicts precisely that it will be useful for some of the things we like to study, without it really being a “thing”.
It doesn’t have to be either or. You can learn maths from books, .ir record your knowledge in them.
Consider Vaniver on Harari on cultural artefacts:-