A tree doesn’t simulate a meaningful algorithm, so the analogy would be chopping it down being approximately just as good.
When talking about running algorithms, I’m not making claims about identity or preserving-the-original in some other sense, as I don’t see how these things are morally important, necessarily (I can’t rule out that they might be, on reflection, but currently I don’t see it). What I’m saying is that a biological brain doesn’t have an advantage at the task of running the algorithms of a human mind well, for any sensible notion of running them well. We currently entrust this task to the biological brain, because there is no other choice, and because it’s always been like this. But I don’t see a moral argument there.
If I take a tree, and I create a computer simulation of that tree, the simulation will not be a way of running the original tree forward at all.
A tree doesn’t simulate a meaningful algorithm, so the analogy would be chopping it down being approximately just as good.
When talking about running algorithms, I’m not making claims about identity or preserving-the-original in some other sense, as I don’t see how these things are morally important, necessarily (I can’t rule out that they might be, on reflection, but currently I don’t see it). What I’m saying is that a biological brain doesn’t have an advantage at the task of running the algorithms of a human mind well, for any sensible notion of running them well. We currently entrust this task to the biological brain, because there is no other choice, and because it’s always been like this. But I don’t see a moral argument there.