Regarding the first paragraph, I don’t see that Pascal’s wager requires all these contortions. It only requires estimating the utility of belief in God, and then makes a positive assertion about what you should do with that utility.
Would you agree that your arguments are arguments for why the utility of believing in God should be low?
Regarding the second paragraph, I agree there is a weird double-think aspect to Pascal’s Wager. Just in that someone admitting, if PW converted they, that they are believing in something just because it was convenient to do so. Can you really believe something for that reason, knowing that is the reason? So this is an argument in the category, ‘you can’t really choose your beliefs as an act of will’.
Regarding the first paragraph, I don’t see that Pascal’s wager requires all these contortions. It only requires estimating the utility of belief in God, and then makes a positive assertion about what you should do with that utility.
Would you agree that your arguments are arguments for why the utility of believing in God should be low?
Regarding the second paragraph, I agree there is a weird double-think aspect to Pascal’s Wager. Just in that someone admitting, if PW converted they, that they are believing in something just because it was convenient to do so. Can you really believe something for that reason, knowing that is the reason? So this is an argument in the category, ‘you can’t really choose your beliefs as an act of will’.