Suicide occupies a strange place in agent theory. It is the one goal whose attainment is not only impossible to observe, but whose attainment hinges on the impossibility of it being observed by the agent.
In some cases, this is resolved by a transfer of agency to the thing for whom the agent is in fact a sub-agent and is itself experiencing selective pressure, e.g. in the case of the beehive observing the altruistic suicide of an individual bee defending it. This behaviour disappears once the sub-agent experiences selective pressures that are independent from those of its parent process, and when acting as a sub-agent for it no longer confers it an advantage for survival and reproduction.
Looking at agents with greater cognitive power, the reason for the existence for this paradox is not so clear. It could be that all suicidal behaviour ultimately boils down to behaviours aimed at improving the fitness of the unit begetting/containing it (e.g. by freeing up resources for a community of agents), and the cases where this does not happen are basically overshoot-type glitches that are ultimately going to be selected against, or it could be due to hidden relations and mechanisms that improve the fitness of some other unit which the agent might not even be aware of, but for whom the agent is perhaps an unwitting sub-agent.
one goal whose attainment is not only impossible to observe
This part doesn’t sound that unique? It’s typical for agents to have goals (or more generally values) that are not directly observable (cf Human values are a function of Humans’ latent variables), and very often they only have indirect evidence about the actualization of those goals / values (which may be indirect evidence for their actualization in the distant future at which the agent may not even exist to even potentially be able to observe) - such as my philanthropic values extending over people I will never meet and whose well-being I will never observe.
Death not only precludes the ability to make observations but also to make inferences based on indirect evidence or deduction, as is the case with your philanthropic values being actualized as a result of your actions.
I think psychological parts (see Multiagent Models of Mind) have an analogy of apoptosis, and if someone’s having such a bad time that their priors expect apoptosis is the norm, sometimes this misgeneralises to the whole individual or their self identity. It’s an off target effect of a psychological subroutine which has a purpose; to reduce how much glitchy and damaged make the whole self have as a bad a time.
Suicide occupies a strange place in agent theory. It is the one goal whose attainment is not only impossible to observe, but whose attainment hinges on the impossibility of it being observed by the agent.
In some cases, this is resolved by a transfer of agency to the thing for whom the agent is in fact a sub-agent and is itself experiencing selective pressure, e.g. in the case of the beehive observing the altruistic suicide of an individual bee defending it. This behaviour disappears once the sub-agent experiences selective pressures that are independent from those of its parent process, and when acting as a sub-agent for it no longer confers it an advantage for survival and reproduction.
Looking at agents with greater cognitive power, the reason for the existence for this paradox is not so clear. It could be that all suicidal behaviour ultimately boils down to behaviours aimed at improving the fitness of the unit begetting/containing it (e.g. by freeing up resources for a community of agents), and the cases where this does not happen are basically overshoot-type glitches that are ultimately going to be selected against, or it could be due to hidden relations and mechanisms that improve the fitness of some other unit which the agent might not even be aware of, but for whom the agent is perhaps an unwitting sub-agent.
This part doesn’t sound that unique? It’s typical for agents to have goals (or more generally values) that are not directly observable (cf Human values are a function of Humans’ latent variables), and very often they only have indirect evidence about the actualization of those goals / values (which may be indirect evidence for their actualization in the distant future at which the agent may not even exist to even potentially be able to observe) - such as my philanthropic values extending over people I will never meet and whose well-being I will never observe.
Death not only precludes the ability to make observations but also to make inferences based on indirect evidence or deduction, as is the case with your philanthropic values being actualized as a result of your actions.
Future causally unobserved facts are accessible from the past via inference from past data or abstract principles. It’s called “prediction”.
The fact in question is not just unobserved, but unobservable because its attainment hinges on losing one’s ability to make the observation.
I think psychological parts (see Multiagent Models of Mind) have an analogy of apoptosis, and if someone’s having such a bad time that their priors expect apoptosis is the norm, sometimes this misgeneralises to the whole individual or their self identity. It’s an off target effect of a psychological subroutine which has a purpose; to reduce how much glitchy and damaged make the whole self have as a bad a time.