Many neurotypicals I have spoken to will take really extreme positions on the fat man trolley problem, saying that they wouldn’t push the fat man off the bridge even if a million people were on the trolley.
Eh, as I’ve argued before on LW, there are utilitarian, AS-compatible justifications for such a position: specifically, that your heroic act shuffles around the risk profiles of various activities in unpredictable ways, thus limiting the ability of people to manage risks, leading them to waste significant resources (perhaps exceeding the amount that would otherwise save more than a million lives) returning to their preferred risk profile.
The key part:
By intervening to push someone onto the track, you suddenly and unpredictably shift around the causal structure associated with danger in the world, on top of saving a few lives. Now, people have to worry about more heros drafting sacrificial lambs “like that one guy did a few months ago” and have to go to greater lengths to get the same level of risk.
In other words, all the “prediction difficulty” costs associated with randomly changing the “rules of the game” apply. Just as it’s costly to make people keep updating their knowledge of what’s okay and what isn’t, it’s costly to make people update their knowledge of what’s risky and what isn’t (and to less efficient regimes, no less).
Note that this doesn’t argue for a deontological prohibition, but rather, argues about the consequences of sudden deviations from social norms, without assumption of their categorical justness.
ETA: In terms of Timeless Decision Theory, you could put it this way: if people knew that bridge-walkers are drafted for deadly work on a moment’s notice, it’s much less likely you’d have a fat person handy to begin with. So, the way TDT calculates probabilities, the EU of pushing the fat guy off is very small on account of its low TDT-probability, eliminating the supposed utility gain.
It’ isn’t just about being fat while being on a bridge over trolley tracks, of course. It might be a worse world if people generally believed they should take deadly action when they see a utilitarian win.
Much less likely? That would require that such drafting be more likely on bridges than elesewhere (how often do these train accidents happen?) Also, ex ante one is more likely to find oneself one of the million saved than the one person sacrificing, so most everyone should agree to a policy that those in positions to offer incredible help be drafted.
Much less likely? That would require that such drafting be more likely on bridges than elesewhere
The problem induced by pushing the fat guy off is that people don’t know which zones now count as “sacrificial lamb” zones (because of the bizarreness of the deviation from social norms), except that bridges over densely-populated trolley tracks are one of them, so I think the resulting world meets this criterion.
one is more likely to find oneself one of the million saved than the one person sacrificing, so most everyone should agree to a policy that those in positions to offer incredible help be drafted.
But people are already choosing risk profiles that, under present social norms, cause them to die when near tracks that have an errant trolley coming, so it’s not clear why they’d make tradeoffs (giving up other things they value) for greater near-trolley safety, and thus not clear why they’d prefer this at all.
In this case, the cost (borne by everyone in the area, not just people near tracks) is that they have to re-organize their lives around choosing routes that avoid sacrificial lamb zones. But—by the scenario’s stipulation—people aren’t currently choosing to bear the additional cost to be on the safer bridge rather than the dangerous track. (If they were, the scenario would involve millions crossing the bridge and few near the track.) What they are choosing is to bear the risk of death because of the convenience it affords.
And because the option of pushing someone off the track tells people, “Okay, you have to be a lot more risk averse to get your current level of risk”, they’re forced to pay more for the same safety.
Eh, as I’ve argued before on LW, there are utilitarian, AS-compatible justifications for such a position: specifically, that your heroic act shuffles around the risk profiles of various activities in unpredictable ways, thus limiting the ability of people to manage risks, leading them to waste significant resources (perhaps exceeding the amount that would otherwise save more than a million lives) returning to their preferred risk profile.
The key part:
Note that this doesn’t argue for a deontological prohibition, but rather, argues about the consequences of sudden deviations from social norms, without assumption of their categorical justness.
ETA: In terms of Timeless Decision Theory, you could put it this way: if people knew that bridge-walkers are drafted for deadly work on a moment’s notice, it’s much less likely you’d have a fat person handy to begin with. So, the way TDT calculates probabilities, the EU of pushing the fat guy off is very small on account of its low TDT-probability, eliminating the supposed utility gain.
It’ isn’t just about being fat while being on a bridge over trolley tracks, of course. It might be a worse world if people generally believed they should take deadly action when they see a utilitarian win.
Much less likely? That would require that such drafting be more likely on bridges than elesewhere (how often do these train accidents happen?) Also, ex ante one is more likely to find oneself one of the million saved than the one person sacrificing, so most everyone should agree to a policy that those in positions to offer incredible help be drafted.
The problem induced by pushing the fat guy off is that people don’t know which zones now count as “sacrificial lamb” zones (because of the bizarreness of the deviation from social norms), except that bridges over densely-populated trolley tracks are one of them, so I think the resulting world meets this criterion.
But people are already choosing risk profiles that, under present social norms, cause them to die when near tracks that have an errant trolley coming, so it’s not clear why they’d make tradeoffs (giving up other things they value) for greater near-trolley safety, and thus not clear why they’d prefer this at all.
In this case, the cost (borne by everyone in the area, not just people near tracks) is that they have to re-organize their lives around choosing routes that avoid sacrificial lamb zones. But—by the scenario’s stipulation—people aren’t currently choosing to bear the additional cost to be on the safer bridge rather than the dangerous track. (If they were, the scenario would involve millions crossing the bridge and few near the track.) What they are choosing is to bear the risk of death because of the convenience it affords.
And because the option of pushing someone off the track tells people, “Okay, you have to be a lot more risk averse to get your current level of risk”, they’re forced to pay more for the same safety.