My layman understanding of the VDV is that their goals are primarily political (“Anti-coup”) and meant for rapid deployment to counter uprisings etc. rather than maximizing military effectiveness. This reflects how they were used in Ukraine—contrary to their expectations, this was a real war and not an uprising.
Giving disproportionate ressources to “Republican Guard” units seem like a common pattern in authoritarian countries.
I think it’s somewhat complicated—the VDV is also used in conventional operations thanks to its elite and volunteer status (see for instance this primer on Russian military methods), which makes them more reliable and effective than conscript forces even in some more “conventional” tasks.
In some ways this might be considered similar to the structure of the post-WWII French military, where the paratroopers and the Foreign Legion were made up of volunteers and used preferentially over conscript forces—indeed, as I understand it France did not use conscripts at all in the Indochina War, and favored using its “more reliable” volunteer units in the Algerian War, with the infamous Battle of Algiers conducted primarily by paratroopers.
(Ironically, the reliability of these units in combat did not mean political reliability—when the French government eventually decided to grant Algerian independence, some of the paratroopers joined a coup attempt!)
At the same time though, Russia has invested substantially in technological capabilities for its airborne forces to assist in their primary airborne mission, with things like the BMD- and BTR- series of airborne APCs/IFVs, multi-canopy and rocket-assisted parachutes to allow these vehicles to be dropped (in some cases with crews inside!), and so on.
Thank you for a very thought-provoking post.
My layman understanding of the VDV is that their goals are primarily political (“Anti-coup”) and meant for rapid deployment to counter uprisings etc. rather than maximizing military effectiveness. This reflects how they were used in Ukraine—contrary to their expectations, this was a real war and not an uprising.
Giving disproportionate ressources to “Republican Guard” units seem like a common pattern in authoritarian countries.
I think it’s somewhat complicated—the VDV is also used in conventional operations thanks to its elite and volunteer status (see for instance this primer on Russian military methods), which makes them more reliable and effective than conscript forces even in some more “conventional” tasks.
In some ways this might be considered similar to the structure of the post-WWII French military, where the paratroopers and the Foreign Legion were made up of volunteers and used preferentially over conscript forces—indeed, as I understand it France did not use conscripts at all in the Indochina War, and favored using its “more reliable” volunteer units in the Algerian War, with the infamous Battle of Algiers conducted primarily by paratroopers.
(Ironically, the reliability of these units in combat did not mean political reliability—when the French government eventually decided to grant Algerian independence, some of the paratroopers joined a coup attempt!)
At the same time though, Russia has invested substantially in technological capabilities for its airborne forces to assist in their primary airborne mission, with things like the BMD- and BTR- series of airborne APCs/IFVs, multi-canopy and rocket-assisted parachutes to allow these vehicles to be dropped (in some cases with crews inside!), and so on.