“At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded.” (Wittgenstein, On Certainty)
And more precisely:
“The questions we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.”
Hayek touches this obliquely—the error of demanding explicit justification for everything, including the knowledge that makes justification possible. To demand a proof-chain all the way down is to misunderstand how knowledge actually works.
Albert’s Münchhausen Trilemma is the critical-rationalist statement of the same problem: any demand for complete justification ends in infinite regress, circularity, or arbitrary stopping points. Some things are not the object of proof—they are the condition of proof.
“At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded.” (Wittgenstein, On Certainty) And more precisely: “The questions we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.” Hayek touches this obliquely—the error of demanding explicit justification for everything, including the knowledge that makes justification possible. To demand a proof-chain all the way down is to misunderstand how knowledge actually works. Albert’s Münchhausen Trilemma is the critical-rationalist statement of the same problem: any demand for complete justification ends in infinite regress, circularity, or arbitrary stopping points. Some things are not the object of proof—they are the condition of proof.