Decision theory generally assumes that you’re self-interested. But if I’m the algorithm, then I care about algorithm me—not the version in the real world. So then I wouldn’t care about what the output of the algorithm was.
Yes, I think FDT (and every other decision rule) becomes kind of incoherent if you are trying to do indexical selfishness. But I’m not indexically selfish! If I’m in a simulation, I want the version of me outside the sim to be happy too, and in general for the world to be good. We both know that (under materialistic assumptions) personal identity is not well-defined, and selfishness is irrational. You even wrote a post about this! So I don’t think it’s FDT’s fault that it doesn’t work well under indexical selfishness.
I also find it weird that you stipulate that you can tell about yourself that you are conscious but the simulated being is not. If that’s the case, then there is a noticeable difference between you and the sim that influences your decisions, so the sim is not a good predictor of your behavior.
Why does CDT become incoherent if you’re indexically selfish?
Something can be a good predictor between you even if there is a noticeable difference between you and then. The standard Newcomb’s problem doesn’t assume that there’s a conscious organism running in the simulator’s mind.
Suppose you’re copied and one of the copies is asked to decide between A) he gets one scoop of ice cream or B) the other copy gets two scoops of ice cream. Under CDT with indexical selfishness, before you’re copied (or know which copy you are) you want your future self to choose B (and would self-bind or self-modify if you could to cause this), but afterwards you’d choose A.
Yes, I think FDT (and every other decision rule) becomes kind of incoherent if you are trying to do indexical selfishness. But I’m not indexically selfish! If I’m in a simulation, I want the version of me outside the sim to be happy too, and in general for the world to be good. We both know that (under materialistic assumptions) personal identity is not well-defined, and selfishness is irrational. You even wrote a post about this! So I don’t think it’s FDT’s fault that it doesn’t work well under indexical selfishness.
I also find it weird that you stipulate that you can tell about yourself that you are conscious but the simulated being is not. If that’s the case, then there is a noticeable difference between you and the sim that influences your decisions, so the sim is not a good predictor of your behavior.
Why does CDT become incoherent if you’re indexically selfish?
Something can be a good predictor between you even if there is a noticeable difference between you and then. The standard Newcomb’s problem doesn’t assume that there’s a conscious organism running in the simulator’s mind.
Suppose you’re copied and one of the copies is asked to decide between A) he gets one scoop of ice cream or B) the other copy gets two scoops of ice cream. Under CDT with indexical selfishness, before you’re copied (or know which copy you are) you want your future self to choose B (and would self-bind or self-modify if you could to cause this), but afterwards you’d choose A.