But should we maximise total satisfaction with the utility-aggregating method being maximised, or average satisfaction with that aggregating method?
I think those are the same if the people whose votes are counted are only the people who already exist or will exist regardless of one’s choices. Total utilitarianism and average utilitarianism come apart on the question of how to count votes by people who are newly brought into existence.
And is it preferable to have a small population who are very satisfied with the utility aggregation method, or a much larger population who think the utility aggregation method is only getting it right slightly more often than chance?
I agree that this needs an answer. Personally, I think the proposal in question makes a lot of sense in combination with an approach that’s focused on the preferences of already existing people.
[Edit: the following example is bad. I might rewrite my thoughts about meta-preferentialism in the future, in which case I will write a better example and link to it here]
I did answer that question (albeit indirectly) but let me make it explicit.
Because of score voting the issue between total and average-aggregating is indeed dissolved (even with a fixed population)
Now I will note that in the case of the second problem score voting will also solve this the vast majority of the time, but let’s look at a (very) rare case where it would actually be a tie:
Alice and Bob want: Total (0,25), Average (1), Median (0)
Cindy and Dan want: Total (0,25), Average (0), Median (1)
And Elizabeth wants: Total (1), Average (0), Median (0)
So the final score is: Total (2), Average (2), Median (2)
(Note that for convenience I assume that this is with the ambivalence factor already calculated in)
In this case only one person is completely in favor of total with the others being lukewarm to it, but with a very strong split among the average-median question (Yes this is a very bizarre scenario)
Now numerically these all have the same preference, so the next question becomes: what do we pursue? This could be solved with a score vote too: How strong is your preference for:
(1) Picking one strategy at random (2) Pursuing all strategies 33% of the time (3) Picking the method that the least amount of people gave a zero (4) Only pursuing the methods that more than one person gave a 1 proportionally …etc, etc...
But what if, due to some unbelievable cosmic coincidence, that next vote also ends in a tie?
Well you go up one more level until either the ambivalence takes over (I doubt I would care after 5 levels of meta) or until there is a tie-breaker. Although it is technically possible to have a tie in an infinite amount of meta-levels, in reality this will never happen.
And yes you go as many levels of meta as needed to solve the problem. I only call it ‘meta-preference utilitarianism’ because ‘gauging-a-potentially-infinite-amount-of-meta-preferences utilitarianism’ isn’t quite as catchy.
I think those are the same if the people whose votes are counted are only the people who already exist or will exist regardless of one’s choices. Total utilitarianism and average utilitarianism come apart on the question of how to count votes by people who are newly brought into existence.
I agree that this needs an answer. Personally, I think the proposal in question makes a lot of sense in combination with an approach that’s focused on the preferences of already existing people.
[Edit: the following example is bad. I might rewrite my thoughts about meta-preferentialism in the future, in which case I will write a better example and link to it here]
I did answer that question (albeit indirectly) but let me make it explicit.
Because of score voting the issue between total and average-aggregating is indeed dissolved (even with a fixed population)
Now I will note that in the case of the second problem score voting will also solve this the vast majority of the time, but let’s look at a (very) rare case where it would actually be a tie:
Alice and Bob want: Total (0,25), Average (1), Median (0)
Cindy and Dan want: Total (0,25), Average (0), Median (1)
And Elizabeth wants: Total (1), Average (0), Median (0)
So the final score is: Total (2), Average (2), Median (2)
(Note that for convenience I assume that this is with the ambivalence factor already calculated in)
In this case only one person is completely in favor of total with the others being lukewarm to it, but with a very strong split among the average-median question (Yes this is a very bizarre scenario)
Now numerically these all have the same preference, so the next question becomes: what do we pursue? This could be solved with a score vote too: How strong is your preference for:
(1) Picking one strategy at random (2) Pursuing all strategies 33% of the time (3) Picking the method that the least amount of people gave a zero (4) Only pursuing the methods that more than one person gave a 1 proportionally …etc, etc...
But what if, due to some unbelievable cosmic coincidence, that next vote also ends in a tie?
Well you go up one more level until either the ambivalence takes over (I doubt I would care after 5 levels of meta) or until there is a tie-breaker. Although it is technically possible to have a tie in an infinite amount of meta-levels, in reality this will never happen.
And yes you go as many levels of meta as needed to solve the problem. I only call it ‘meta-preference utilitarianism’ because ‘gauging-a-potentially-infinite-amount-of-meta-preferences utilitarianism’ isn’t quite as catchy.