I don’t think the first fallacy is fairly attributed to Aristotle. It would be a mistake to attribute a modern, mechanistic view of causality to Aristotle, and thereby its restrictions (like ‘no backwards causality’) but that’s actually beside the point. Aristotle regarded the ‘final cause’ of something to be, as it were, simultaneous with it. The final cause of a shovel is to dig, but a shovel need never dig an ounce for this to be true. No reference to an actual future event is necessary. Nor, in fact, do any of Aristotle’s causes refer to specific temporal events or objects (except accidentally): Aristotle’s physical theory isn’t a mechanistic one. He discusses mechanistic physics (mostly in Generation and Corruption) but it’s not a big deal for him. He’s trying to talk about a different sort of subject matter.
The argument for the second fallacy relies on...well, a fallacy: to say that the ascription of teleology to non-humans is anthropomorphic is to assume that because teleology (on some understanding) is a feature of human reasoning, it must be the case that teleology is a feature only of human reasoning. Aristotle explicitly denies this in Physics II.8. It does not follow from the fact that we have the impression of reasoning teleologically that the ascription of final causes to things is anthropomorphic.
Finally, you say:
“More rigorous reasoning would say:
My model predicts that if Mary turns left she will arrive at the supermarket. I don’t know her every neuron, but I believe Mary has a model similar to mine. I believe Mary desires to be at the supermarket. I believe that Mary has a planning mechanism similar to mine, which leads her to take actions that her model predicts will lead to the fulfillment of her desires. Therefore I predict that Mary will turn left.
No direct mention of the actual future has been made.”
You have made direct mention of the future here, in every significant sense. You’ve said that Mary ‘desires to be at the supermarket’: Mary’s desire refers to a future state. You say that she’s planning and predicting: we don’t plan about the past or the present. How can we make sense of a ‘planning mechanism’ or a ‘prediction’ except in reference to the future?
You’ve hidden the references to the future in faculties (desire, planning, prediction) which involve themselves in reference to the future, but your explanation is no less teleological. There’s simply no sense to be made of Mary’s behavior without reference to the object of her desire, her planning, and her prediction. You’re right that this isn’t just ‘whatever actual future is in store for her’, since if she takes a wrong turn, she’ll turn around. But how can we make sense of her constantly evaluating and altering her behavior for the sake of going to the store unless we understand it teleologically? How could we make sense of success or failure otherwise?
The consistant mistake here is the assumption that a teleological cause must draw an arrow backwards in time from an actual future state to the actual present. This was not Aristotle’s view. On Aristotle’s view, the final cause is importantly related to the future, but only in the very senses you appealed to in your revised description of Mary’s behavior. You’ve admitted teleology just as Aristotle would wish to argue for it.
I don’t think the first fallacy is fairly attributed to Aristotle. It would be a mistake to attribute a modern, mechanistic view of causality to Aristotle, and thereby its restrictions (like ‘no backwards causality’) but that’s actually beside the point. Aristotle regarded the ‘final cause’ of something to be, as it were, simultaneous with it. The final cause of a shovel is to dig, but a shovel need never dig an ounce for this to be true. No reference to an actual future event is necessary. Nor, in fact, do any of Aristotle’s causes refer to specific temporal events or objects (except accidentally): Aristotle’s physical theory isn’t a mechanistic one. He discusses mechanistic physics (mostly in Generation and Corruption) but it’s not a big deal for him. He’s trying to talk about a different sort of subject matter.
The argument for the second fallacy relies on...well, a fallacy: to say that the ascription of teleology to non-humans is anthropomorphic is to assume that because teleology (on some understanding) is a feature of human reasoning, it must be the case that teleology is a feature only of human reasoning. Aristotle explicitly denies this in Physics II.8. It does not follow from the fact that we have the impression of reasoning teleologically that the ascription of final causes to things is anthropomorphic.
Finally, you say: “More rigorous reasoning would say:
My model predicts that if Mary turns left she will arrive at the supermarket. I don’t know her every neuron, but I believe Mary has a model similar to mine. I believe Mary desires to be at the supermarket. I believe that Mary has a planning mechanism similar to mine, which leads her to take actions that her model predicts will lead to the fulfillment of her desires. Therefore I predict that Mary will turn left.
No direct mention of the actual future has been made.”
You have made direct mention of the future here, in every significant sense. You’ve said that Mary ‘desires to be at the supermarket’: Mary’s desire refers to a future state. You say that she’s planning and predicting: we don’t plan about the past or the present. How can we make sense of a ‘planning mechanism’ or a ‘prediction’ except in reference to the future?
You’ve hidden the references to the future in faculties (desire, planning, prediction) which involve themselves in reference to the future, but your explanation is no less teleological. There’s simply no sense to be made of Mary’s behavior without reference to the object of her desire, her planning, and her prediction. You’re right that this isn’t just ‘whatever actual future is in store for her’, since if she takes a wrong turn, she’ll turn around. But how can we make sense of her constantly evaluating and altering her behavior for the sake of going to the store unless we understand it teleologically? How could we make sense of success or failure otherwise?
The consistant mistake here is the assumption that a teleological cause must draw an arrow backwards in time from an actual future state to the actual present. This was not Aristotle’s view. On Aristotle’s view, the final cause is importantly related to the future, but only in the very senses you appealed to in your revised description of Mary’s behavior. You’ve admitted teleology just as Aristotle would wish to argue for it.