The teeth example at the beginning is strong because it implies the rest. I skimmed because the conclusions seemed obvious from that example and the following paragraph: intent is the cause, not that which is intended, and teeth are not the kind of things that intend.
Your section on backward causality seems to subsume the argument on mind projection. If the point on backwards causality is that the intent for x is not x itself, that covers most of what you want to say about projecting telos on x. Anthropomorphism would seem to cover the rest, that x is not that kind of thing.
The teeth example at the beginning is strong because it implies the rest. I skimmed because the conclusions seemed obvious from that example and the following paragraph: intent is the cause, not that which is intended, and teeth are not the kind of things that intend.
Your section on backward causality seems to subsume the argument on mind projection. If the point on backwards causality is that the intent for x is not x itself, that covers most of what you want to say about projecting telos on x. Anthropomorphism would seem to cover the rest, that x is not that kind of thing.