So there is a distinction between the Categorical Imperative and the formulation of the Categorical Imperative (of which Kant as three). You can argue that the first formulation (the universal maxim one) doesn’t return answers for some or all actions unless what Kant is really doing is taking insights from imagining a possible world in which the maxim is universalized and mistaking them for insights about the rationality/self-consistency of the maxim when universalized. But the CI in itself is just the principle of “pure practical reason” from which particular rules are derived.
Take Euclid. He thought that all his conclusions followed deductively from his axioms and that his depictions were just illustrations and played no role in the formal proof. Most people dispute this. Euclid’s particular geometry might make undeclared assumptions and use the visual models to draw conclusions that don’t follow formally. But we would still never write, “Euclid sought to describe plane geometry as beginning with a set of axioms and from there, proved propositions about planer figures with the help of undeclared assumptions and visual aids.”
Take Euclid. He thought that all his conclusions followed deductively from his axioms and that his depictions were just illustrations and played no role in the formal proof. … But we would still never write, “Euclid sought to describe plane geometry as beginning with a set of axioms and from there, proved propositions about planar figures with the help of undeclared assumptions and visual aids.”
Really? Euclid’s axiomatic system was only clarified in the late 19th century by Hilbert, and the logic of his visual models is a subject of ongoing research. So this looks like it could be a sensible description of Euclid in an article about how geometrical reasoning might be formalized, since a system which took Euclid’s pretenses at face value would face unexpected (and unacceptable) limitations. Now I agree that the OP has other problems, but perhaps this is simply a difference in perspective.
They point is Euclid wasn’t trying to prove propositions with the help of undeclared assumptions and visual aids. He was trying to formalize it deductively and thought he had. The fact that he doesn’t actually do that is a flaw not a feature of the Elements. Similarly, if indeed one of Kant’s formulations of the CI fails to tell us how to act in an a priori way then one wouldn’t conclude that Kant sought to explain morality as a concern about impacts. Rather, one would conclude that Kant had failed to show morality isn’t a concern about impacts.
The fact that he doesn’t actually do that is a flaw not a feature of the Elements.
I’m sorry, this conclusion doesn’t follow. According to modern mathematicians, Euclid’s contributions to mathematics were twofold:
systematizing geometrical knowledge (much like the Bourbaki group would systematize math in the 20th century)
developing the deductive, axiomatic method with rigorous proofs.
It is true that Euclid’s axioms had a number of gaps which Euclid himself would probably have remedied if he had known about them (e.g. the assumption that a line has at least two points). But the status of his visual aids is far less clear: Euclid himself had no notion of formal proof, and his use of visual aids is in fact quite rigorous. So describing them as a flaw of the Elements seems unjustified: we do not know what Euclid would have done if he’d known about our modern notions of proof, but most likely he would have used them anyway, and he could still be credited with developing the axiomatic method.
Similarly, Kant’s contributions from the POV of modern ethicists were:
coming up with the various formulations of the CI
making a fairly convincing argument that these may be apriori justified by the principles of “pure practical reason”
The technicalities of what Kant meant exactly by “a priori” and “pure practical reason”, and whether the notion of “impact” is consistent with them are largely irrelevant to Kant’s accomplishment. Even if Kant’s CI turned out to be largely concerned with impact, it would still be widely cited as an example of moral duty, and one which may be in some sense logically justified by the principles of rationality.
So there is a distinction between the Categorical Imperative and the formulation of the Categorical Imperative (of which Kant as three). You can argue that the first formulation (the universal maxim one) doesn’t return answers for some or all actions unless what Kant is really doing is taking insights from imagining a possible world in which the maxim is universalized and mistaking them for insights about the rationality/self-consistency of the maxim when universalized. But the CI in itself is just the principle of “pure practical reason” from which particular rules are derived.
Take Euclid. He thought that all his conclusions followed deductively from his axioms and that his depictions were just illustrations and played no role in the formal proof. Most people dispute this. Euclid’s particular geometry might make undeclared assumptions and use the visual models to draw conclusions that don’t follow formally. But we would still never write, “Euclid sought to describe plane geometry as beginning with a set of axioms and from there, proved propositions about planer figures with the help of undeclared assumptions and visual aids.”
Really? Euclid’s axiomatic system was only clarified in the late 19th century by Hilbert, and the logic of his visual models is a subject of ongoing research. So this looks like it could be a sensible description of Euclid in an article about how geometrical reasoning might be formalized, since a system which took Euclid’s pretenses at face value would face unexpected (and unacceptable) limitations. Now I agree that the OP has other problems, but perhaps this is simply a difference in perspective.
They point is Euclid wasn’t trying to prove propositions with the help of undeclared assumptions and visual aids. He was trying to formalize it deductively and thought he had. The fact that he doesn’t actually do that is a flaw not a feature of the Elements. Similarly, if indeed one of Kant’s formulations of the CI fails to tell us how to act in an a priori way then one wouldn’t conclude that Kant sought to explain morality as a concern about impacts. Rather, one would conclude that Kant had failed to show morality isn’t a concern about impacts.
I’m sorry, this conclusion doesn’t follow. According to modern mathematicians, Euclid’s contributions to mathematics were twofold:
systematizing geometrical knowledge (much like the Bourbaki group would systematize math in the 20th century)
developing the deductive, axiomatic method with rigorous proofs.
It is true that Euclid’s axioms had a number of gaps which Euclid himself would probably have remedied if he had known about them (e.g. the assumption that a line has at least two points). But the status of his visual aids is far less clear: Euclid himself had no notion of formal proof, and his use of visual aids is in fact quite rigorous. So describing them as a flaw of the Elements seems unjustified: we do not know what Euclid would have done if he’d known about our modern notions of proof, but most likely he would have used them anyway, and he could still be credited with developing the axiomatic method.
Similarly, Kant’s contributions from the POV of modern ethicists were:
coming up with the various formulations of the CI
making a fairly convincing argument that these may be apriori justified by the principles of “pure practical reason”
The technicalities of what Kant meant exactly by “a priori” and “pure practical reason”, and whether the notion of “impact” is consistent with them are largely irrelevant to Kant’s accomplishment. Even if Kant’s CI turned out to be largely concerned with impact, it would still be widely cited as an example of moral duty, and one which may be in some sense logically justified by the principles of rationality.