If something is a good idea, you need a reason to not try doing more of it.
Taken at face value, it implies the following:
If something is a bad idea, you need a reason to not try doing less of it.
I like this post, but the logic here troubles me a bit. Let me lay out why I think the implication might be invalid and the original statement is also a little questionable.
If we formalize it:
A = “something is a good idea”
B = “you need a reason to not try doing more of it”
The original post asserts [A ⇒ B]. But a true implication only guarantees its contrapositive, [¬B ⇒ ¬A] , not the inverse the post jumps to. So let’s unpack the contrapositive:
¬B = “you don’t need a reason to not try doing more of it” ≈ “you can be unapologetically unmotivated to do it” (this step is a bit of a stretch, but roughly close)
¬A = “something is not a good idea”
So the face-value implication should really be:
If you find yourself unapologetically unmotivated to do something, then that thing is not a good idea.
Examining this contrapositive makes it easier to see that the original statement smuggles in a huge assumption about how aware a person is of their own preferences and situation, because counterexamples to the contrapositive are easy to find. Behavioral economics suggests people are pretty irrational: they’re often unapologetically unmotivated to do things that would clearly benefit them, especially under conditions like imperfect-information games (e.g., people under-using a free preventive health resource).
So after thinking it through, I honestly believe the original [A ⇒ B] statement can only hold for a perfectly honed rationalist, so aspirationally it’s true ;).
Anyhow, my point is the original statement isn’t responsible for the implication this post draws from it.
I like this post, but the logic here troubles me a bit. Let me lay out why I think the implication might be invalid and the original statement is also a little questionable.
If we formalize it:
A = “something is a good idea”
B = “you need a reason to not try doing more of it”
The original post asserts [A ⇒ B]. But a true implication only guarantees its contrapositive, [¬B ⇒ ¬A] , not the inverse the post jumps to. So let’s unpack the contrapositive:
¬B = “you don’t need a reason to not try doing more of it” ≈ “you can be unapologetically unmotivated to do it” (this step is a bit of a stretch, but roughly close)
¬A = “something is not a good idea”
So the face-value implication should really be:
Examining this contrapositive makes it easier to see that the original statement smuggles in a huge assumption about how aware a person is of their own preferences and situation, because counterexamples to the contrapositive are easy to find. Behavioral economics suggests people are pretty irrational: they’re often unapologetically unmotivated to do things that would clearly benefit them, especially under conditions like imperfect-information games (e.g., people under-using a free preventive health resource).
So after thinking it through, I honestly believe the original [A ⇒ B] statement can only hold for a perfectly honed rationalist, so aspirationally it’s true ;).
Anyhow, my point is the original statement isn’t responsible for the implication this post draws from it.
Not the chain of reasoning I had in mind. Roughly:
If X is a bad idea, then lack of X is a good idea.
If lack of X is a good idea, then more lack of X is a better idea.
More lack of X is less of X, so less of X is a better idea.