I don’t know about everybody else, but I’m totally confused.
I mean, if it’s visual, why don’t you just make us a picture or a video, instead of just relying on words (which aren’t very good for this purpose)?
I don’t know about everybody else, but I’m totally confused.
I mean, if it’s visual, why don’t you just make us a picture or a video, instead of just relying on words (which aren’t very good for this purpose)?
Perfect!
Instead of jumping to such a reckless conclusion, why don’t you just ask him what he means by “ontologically a verb”?
Solid answer, as far as I can see right now.
Sure, you would be surprised that you were about to die now.
But would you also be surprised that your life didn’t end up being eternal? No, because you know that you will die someday.
But what’s the significance of this distinction for this problem? Well, I don’t understand how the prisoner could think anything other than, “I guess that I’m going to end up dead one of these days around noon (monday, tuesday, wednesday, thursday, or friday).” It’s not like he has any reason to think that it would be more likely to happen one of the days rather than another. But, in your example, you do have a reason for that (dying now would be less likely than dying later).
But, wait, isn’t that the whole issue in contention (whether he has any reason to think that it would be more likely to happen one of the days rather than another)? Yeah, so let me get back to that.
Let’s say that the hangman shows up on the first day at noon (monday). Would the prisoner be “surprised” that it was monday rather than one of the other days? Why would he? He wouldn’t have any information besides that it would be on one of those days. Or let’s say that the hangman shows up on the second day at noon (tuesday). Would the prisoner be “surprised” that it was tuesday instead of one of the other days? I mean, why would he? He wouldn’t have any knowledge except that it would be on one of the next 3 days.
I’m completely confused by this “paradox”.
Maybe you could help me out?
Good point.
Isn’t that exactly what we do here (and on other forums)?
Wasn’t that line (the one saying that the hangman comes for him on wednesday) just supposed to be an example? I didn’t think that the problem required the hangman to come on wednesday; I thought that it left open when he would actually come.
(And, no, I’m definitely not making fun of you.)
the warden was correct in the end
Where?
Oh okay.
No, but I can accurately predict that a coin will come heads or tails.
Oh, I see.
At first, I missed the significance of this passage:
The warden’s statement is then false and unparadoxical. This is similar to the one-day analogue, where the warden says “You will be executed tomorrow at noon, and will be surprised” and the prisoner says “wtf?”.
Then here’s an analogous “paradox”:
There were two men standing in front of me. One said that the ground was red, and the other said that it was blue. Neither of them are ever wrong.
So, yeah, that’s why I said that it sounds like a garden variety contradiction.
Sounds like a garden variety contradiction.
(If it’s past noon on thursday, obviously he would know that it’s going to come the next day at noon; the warden simply would have been wrong.)
Or am I still misunderstanding it?
For the purposes of the problem, to be surprised just means that something happened to you which you didn’t predict beforehand.
Okay, I understand that.
Its not the usual definition (among other things it implies I should be ‘surprised’ if a coin I flip comes up heads) but presumably whoever first came up with the paradox couldn’t think of a better word to express whatever they meant.
But I don’t understand that.
I mean, why couldn’t I simply predict that it would be heads or tails?
Then wouldn’t the prisoner be surprised no matter what?
But, wait, when exactly are we judging whether he’s surprised?
Let’s say that it’s thursday in the afternoon, and he’s sitting around saying to himself, “I’m totally surprised that it’s going to come on friday. I was online reading about this exact situation, and I thought that it couldn’t come on friday, because it would be the last available day, and I would know that it would be coming.” Or are we waiting for that surprise to dissipate, and turn into “well, I guess that I’m going to die tomorrow”?
From what I can see at this point, I think that the “paradox” comes of an equivocation between those two situations (being surprised right after it doesn’t happen, and then having that surprise dissipate into expectation). But I could be wrong.
That’s my understanding of what I value, at least.
Well, I’m not so sure that those words (the ones that I used to summarize your position) even mean anything.
How could you value them wanting to kill you somewhat (which would be you feeling some desire while cycling through a few different instances of imagining them doing something leading to you dying), but also value you not dying even more (which would be you feeling even more desire while moving through a few different examples of imagining you being alive)?
It would be like saying that you value going to the store somewhat (which would be you feeling some desire while cycling through a few different instances of imagining yourself traveling to the store and getting there), but value not actually being at the store (which would be you feeling even more desire while moving through a few different examples of not being at the store). But would that make sense? Do those words (the ones making up the first sentence of this paragraph) even mean anything? Or are they just nonsense?
Simply put, would it make sense to say that somebody could value X+Y (where the addition sign refers to adding the first event to the second in a sequence), but not Y (which is a part of X+Y, which the person apparently likes)?
I assign utility to their values even if they conflict with mine to such a great degree, but I have to measure that against the negative utility they impose on me.
So, as to the example, you would value that they want to kill you somewhat, but you would value not dying even more?
Things like me getting killed in the course of satisfying their utility functions, as you mentioned above, would be a big one.
So basically your “utility function assigns value to the desires of beings whose values conflict with your own” unless they really conflict with your own (such as get you killed in the process)?
How exactly could you be “horrified” about that unless you were comparing some of your own values being maximally realized with some of your other values not being maximally realized?
In other words, it doesn’t make sense (doesn’t even mean anything!) to say that you would be horrified (isn’t that a bad thing?) to have your desires fulfilled (isn’t that a good thing?), unless you’re really just talking about some of your desires conflicting with some of your other desires.