I think this is why I get creeped out by ambitious people sometimes. I’d much rather my doctor be passionate about >medicine than be someone who decided medicine was more “prestigious” than nursing.
Like the alt-text here: “I never trust anyone who’s more excited about success than about doing the thing they want to be successful at.”
“Asking people to give up all forms of sacralized belonging and live in a world of purely “rational” beliefs might be like asking people to give the Earth and live in colonies orbiting the moon.”
-- Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind, quoted here
Harry thought the deepest split in his personality wasn’t anything to do with his dark side; rather it was the divide between the altruistic and forgiving Abstract Reasoning Harry, versus the frustrated and angry Harry In The Moment.
This as well as the distant descendants part seems to draw on Robin’s near vs. far theory.
This article seems relevant: “Clever sillies: Why high IQ people tend to be deficient in common sense.”
The author argues that high IQ people solve problems by using abstract reasoning instead of evolved common sense. Moreover, general intelligence is mainly useful for solving evolutionarily novel problems, and can actually be a hindrance for problems which were a regular part of the evolutionary environment (for example, social situations). Hence, when facing problems where humans have evolved behavioral responses, smart people who apply abstract reasoning and override common sense often end up doing silly things.
I would recommend skipping the section on political correctness. I do think the first two sections give a good lesson on how a little reason can be a dangerous thing.
A person is said to exhibit rational irrationality when it is instrumentally rational for him to be epistemically irrational. An instrumentally rational person chooses the best strategies to achieve his goals. An epistemically irrational person ignores and evades evidence against his beliefs, holds his beliefs without evidence or with only weak evidence, has contradictions in his thinking, employs logical fallacies in belief formation, and exhibits characteristic epistemic vices such as closed-mindedness. Epistemically irrational political beliefs can reinforce one’s self-image; boost one’s self-esteem; make one feel noble, smart, superior, safe, or comfortable; and can help achieve conformity with the group and thus facilitate social acceptance. Thus, epistemic irrationality can be instrumentally rational.
If I falsely believe the road I am crossing is free of cars, I might die. So I have a strong incentive to form beliefs about the road in a rational way. However, if I falsely believe that import quotas are good for the economy, this has no directly harmful effects. (On the contrary, the belief can have significant instrumental value. It might make me feel patriotic; serve my xenophobia; serve as an outlet to rationalize, sublimate, or redirect racist attitudes; or help me pretend to have solidarity with union workers.) … Epistemic rationality is hard and takes self-discipline.
When it comes to politics, individuals have every incentive to indulge their irrational impulses. Demand for irrational beliefs is like demand for most other goods. The lower the cost, the more will be demanded. The cost to the typical voter of voting in epistemically irrational ways is nearly zero. The cost of overcoming bias and epistemic irrationality is high. The psychological benefit of this irrationality is significant. Thus, voters demand a high amount of epistemic irrationality.
Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting, p.173-74
On a related topic, Pinker has a very useful discussion of the case for and against open discussion of dangerous (non-technological) ideas. (Mindkiller warning)
What’s a good term for “being able to pass an ideological Turing test”? (Being able to pass an ITT is related to being able to argue both sides of a debate, being able to accurately explain your opponent’s position, being able to summarize the strongest counterargument to your position, etc.)
Following the original analogy, is there a term for “a machine that’s able to pass a Turing test”? My googling didn’t turn up anything. But if there was (“a machine is called Turing-(blank) if it can pass a Turing test”), then it seems we could adapt it fairly easily to the ITT: someone is ideologically Turing-(blank) if they can pass an ITT.
Any suggestions to fill in the blank?
Turing-capable?
I interpreted the signals as “this woman is interesting,” yet when I got to know those woman, I was not actually >interested in their personality. I put a lot of effort into fixing this miscalibration, and I think it was worth the effort.
Details?
Both strategies might end up producing the same outcome. Define a “Certified Political Belief” as a belief which satisfies the above standards. In my own case, I don’t actually have any strong political beliefs (>90% confidence) which I would claim are Certified (except maybe “liberal democracy is a good thing”).
In fact, a good exercise would be to take your strongest political beliefs, actually write down which academic articles you’ve read that support your position, and then go do a quick test (with a third-party referee) to see whether you’re ideologically Turing-capable. This sounds like a good way to get feedback to help you calibrate.
As a tool for combating privileged questions, what about consciously prioritizing which issues you spend time thinking about?
Academic papers are what get’s published, not what’s true. The difference is particularly pronounced for political topics.
Right, it’s a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.
Good point. Do you think the ideological Turing-capability requirement helps to mitigate this danger, and if so, how much does it help?
Do you think that the standards given in the OP are too demanding? Not demanding enough?
I agree with all of this.
This is interesting. From the end of Ch. 89:
Unseen by anyone, the Defense Professor’s lips curved up in a thin smile. Despite its little ups and downs, on the whole this had been a surprisingly good day
From Ch. 46, after Harry destroys the dementor:
I must admit, Mr. Potter, that although it has had its ups and downs, on the whole, this has been a surprisingly good day.
He had vanished from where he was standing over the Weasley twins and come into existence beside Harry; George Weasley had discontinously teleported from where he was sitting to be kneeling next to his brother’s side
What’s going on here? Is it just that Harry isn’t paying attention to what’s happening around him?
Truth seekers should deliberately impose costs on themselves for holding false beliefs. That is, they should increase the cost of being wrong. One way to do this is to bet on your beliefs. Another way is to bond your beliefs: post a bond that you will forfeit if your prediction is wrong. Yes, imposing such costs is bothersome, but for truth seekers the tradeoff is easily worth it.