Suppose we are neighbors. By some mixup, the power company is combining my electric bill to your own. You notice that your bill is unusually high, but you pay it anyway because you want electricity. In fact, you like electricity so much that you are happy to pay even the high bill to get continued power. Now, suppose that I knew all the details of the situation. Should I tell you about the error?
I think this case is pretty similar to the one you’ve described about the religion that makes you do good things. You pay my bill because you want a good for yourself. I am letting you incur a cost, that you may not want to, because it will benefit me.
I think in the electricity example I have some moral obligation to tell you our bills have been combined. I think this carries over to the religious example. There is a real benefit to me (and to society) to let you continue to labor under your false assumption that doing good deeds would result in magic rewards, but I still think it would be immoral to let this go on. I think the right thing to do would be to try and destroy your false belief with the truth and then try to convince you that altruism can be rewarding in and of itself. That way, you may still be an altruist, but you won’t be fooled into being one.
Hi, I joined just to reply to this comment. I don’t think there is a lot of complexity hidden behind “whatever can be destroyed by truth should be”. If there is a false belief, we should try to replace it with a true one, or at least a less wrong one.
Your argument that goes “But what if you were being tortured to death” doesn’t really hold up because that argument can be used to reach any conclusion. What if you were experiencing perfect bliss, but then, your mind made up an elaborate fantasy which you believe to be your life… What if there were an evil and capricious deity who would torture you for eternity if you chose Frosted Flakes over Fruit Loops for breakfast? These kinds of “What if” statements followed by something of fundamentally unknowable probability are infinite in number and could be used to reach any conclusion you like and therefore, they don’t recomend any conclusion over any other conclusion. I don’t think it is more likely that I am being horribly tortured and fantasizing about writing this comment than I think it is likely that I am in perfect bliss and fantasizing about this, and so, this argument does nothing to recomend ignorance over knowledge.
In retrospect (say it turns out I am being tortured) I may be happier in ignorance, but I would be an inferior rationalist.
I think this applies to Christianity too. At the risk of being polemical, say I believed that Christianity is a scam whereby a select group of people convince the children of the faithful that they are in peril of eternal punishment if they don’t grow up to give 10% of their money to the church. Suppose I think that this is harmful to children and adults. Further, suppose I think the material claims of the religion are false. Now, you on the other hand suppose (I assume) that the material claims of the religion are true and that the children of the faithful are being improved by religious instruction.
Both of us can’t be right here. If we apply the saying “whatever can be destroyed by truth should be” then we should each try to rigorously expose our ideas to the truth. If one of our positions can be destroyed by the truth, it should be. This works no matter who is right (or if neither of us are right). If I am correct, then I destroy your idea, you stop believing in something false, stop assisting in the spread of false beliefs, stop contributing money to a scam, etc. If you are right then my belief will be destroyed, I can gain eternal salvation, stop trying to mislead people from the true faith, begin tithing etc.
In conclusion, I think the saying means exactly what it sounds like.