drnickbone

Karma: 1,153

drnickbone Mar 13, 2014, 5:34 PM
0 points
in reply to: Nisan’s comment on: Irrationality Game III
No, in that large universe model we’d expect to be part of one of the expanded, intergalactic civilisations, and not part of a small, still-at-home civilisation. So, as I stated “we would not expect to see the world as we do in fact see it”. Clearly we could still be part of a small civilisation (nothing logically impossible about being in a tiny minority), or we could be in some sort of zoo or ancestor simulation within a big civilisation. But that’s not what we’d expect to see. You might want to see Ken Olum’s paper for more on this: http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0303070

Incidentally, Olum considers several different ways out of the conflict between expectation and observation: the finite universe is option F (page 5) and that option seems to me to be a lot more plausible than any of the alternatives he sketches. But if you disagree, please tell me which option you think more likely.

drnickbone Mar 13, 2014, 3:06 PM
0 points
in reply to: polymathwannabe’s comment on: Irrationality Game III
I’d suggest that since you agree with some parts but disagree with others, you assign probability a lot less than 90% to the whole hypothesis. So you should think I’m irrationally overconfident in the whole lot, and upvote please!

If you want some detail, I start from the “Great Filter” argument (see http://hanson.gmu.edu/greatfilter.html). I find it very hard to believe that there is a super-strong future filter ahead of us (such that we have < 1 in a million or < 1 in a billion chance of passing it and then expanding into space). But a relatively weak filter implies that rather few civilizations can have got to our stage of development—there can’t have been millions or billions of them, or some would have got past the filter and expanded, and we would not expect to see the world as we do in fact see it. The argument to the universe being finite (and not too big) then follows from there being a limited number of civilizations. SIA and MWI must also be wrong, because they each imply a very large or infinite number of civilizations.

drnickbone Mar 13, 2014, 12:10 PM
10 points
in reply to: Lalartu’s comment on: Irrationality Game III
Not a bad hypothesis, but your confidence level is too high… hence my upvote.

drnickbone Mar 13, 2014, 8:17 AM
20 points
on: Irrationality Game III
The universe is finite, and not much bigger than the region we observe. There is no multiverse (in particular Many Worlds Interpretation is incorrect and SIA is incorrect). There have been a few (< million) intelligent civilisations before human beings but none of them managed to expand into space, which explains Fermi’s paradox. This also implies a mild form of the “Doomsday” argument (we are fairly unlikely to expand ourselves) but not a strong future filter (if instead millions or billions of civilisations had existed, but none of them expanded, there would be a massive future filter). Probability: 90%.

drnickbone Mar 11, 2014, 9:35 PM
0 points
in reply to: Squark’s comment on: Intelligence Metrics with Naturalized Induction using UDT
Is it important to the analysis whether the probabilities converge as D tends to infinity? Do you rely on this at any point?

If you need to make sure the probabilities converge, then you could consider something like the following.

First, split the sentences in your system F into “positive” sentences (the ones which have no leading “not” symbol, ~, or else which have an even number of leading “not” symbols) and “negative” sentences (the ones with an odd number of leading “not” symbols). Sort the positive sentences by length, and then sort them lexicographically within all sentences of the same length. This will give a list s1, s2 etc.

We will now build a growing subset S of sentences, and ensure that in the limit, S is consistent and complete.

At stage 0, S is empty. Call this S0.

At stage n: Toss a fair coin, and if it lands heads then add sn to S. If it lands tails then add ~sn to S. Next, systematically search through all proofs of length up to the length of sn to see if there are any inconsistencies in S. If a proof of inconsistency is found, then list the subset of positive and negative sentences which create the inconsistency e.g. {sa, ~sb, ~sc, …, sz}; let k be the largest index in this list (the largest value of a, b, …, z). If sk was in S, then remove it and add ~sk instead, or if ~sk was in S then replace it by sk. Restart the search for inconsistencies. When the search completes without finding any further inconsistencies we have the set Sn.

We now take the obvious limit Sw of the sets Sn as n tends to infinity: s will belong to Sw if and only if it belongs to all but a finite number of Sn. That limit Sw is guaranteed to exist, because for each m, the process will eventually find a consistent choice of sentences and negations from within {s1, … ,sm} and then stick with it (any contradictions found later will cause the replacement of sentences sk or ~sk with k > m). Further, Sw is guaranteed to be consistent (because any contradictions would have been discovered and removed in some Sn). Finally Sw is guaranteed to be complete, since it contains either sm or ~sm for each m.

We can now define probabilities PD(s) = P(s is a member of SD) and take P(s) as the limit of PD(s) as D tends to infinity. The limit is always defined since it is just the probability that s is a member of Sw.

drnickbone Mar 10, 2014, 10:30 PM
17 points
0
in reply to: dclayh’s comment on: The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality and What To Do About It
For concreteness, imagine a different story where Julie and Mark decide to play Russian roulette in their cabin (again, just for fun). They both miss the bullet, no harm results, and they never tell anyone etc. etc. So what was wrong with their actions?

I think most people would be able to handle that one very quickly. So the really interesting question is why no-one comes up with such an explanation in the incest case.

Expecting evolved moral instincts to conform exactly to some simple unifying principle is like expecting the orbits of the planets to be in the same proportion as the first 9 prime numbers or something. That which is produced by a complex, messy, random process is unlikely to have some low complexity description.

An interesting analogy. I mean, who would predict something crazy like the square of the orbital period being proportional to the cube of the orbital radius?

Obviously there’s no unifying principle in all that messy moral randomness. No hidden laws, just waiting to be discovered...

drnickbone Feb 25, 2014, 8:16 AM
0 points
in reply to: Benya’s comment on: SUDT: A toy decision theory for updateless anthropics
Thank you for a very comprehensive reply.

In terms of clarity of meaning, I have to say that I don’t feel too bad about not spelling out that the utility function is just what you would normally call your utility function

That’s fine. However, normal utility functions do have self-interested components, as well as parochial components (caring about people and things that are “close” to us in various ways, above those which are more “distant”). It’s also true that utilities are not totally determined by such components, and include some general pro bono terms; further that we think in some sense that utilities ought to be disinterested rather than selfish or parochial. Hence my thought that SUDT could be strengthened by barring selfish or parochial terms, or imposing some sort of veil of ignorance so that only terms like u(+NotMe) and u(-NotMe) affect decisions.

Allowing for self-interest, then in the counterfactual mugging scenario we most likely have u(+Me) >> u(+NotMe) > u(-NotMe) >> u(-Me), rather than u(+NotMe) = u(-NotMe). The decider will still be inclined to pick “H” (matching our initial intuition), but with some hesitation, particularly if Omega’s coin was very heavily weighted to tails in the first place. The internal dialogue in that place will go something like this: “Hmm, it was so very unlikely that the coin fell heads—I can’t believe that happened! Hmm, perhaps it didn’t, and I’m in some sort of Omega-simulation. For the good of the world outside my simulation, I’d better pick T after all”. That’s roughly where I am with my own reaction to Counterfactual Mugging right now.

Against a background of modal realism or a many-worlds-interpretation (which in my opinion is where UDT makes most sense), caring only about the good of “our” world looks like a sort of parochialism, which is why Counterfactual Mugging is interesting. Suddenly it seems to matter whether these other worlds exist or not, rather than just being a philosophical curiosity.
What links here?
- drnickbone's comment on Irrationality Game III by CellBioGuy (Mar 21, 2014, 5:29 PM; 2 points)

drnickbone Feb 24, 2014, 10:31 PM
0 points
on: SUDT: A toy decision theory for updateless anthropics
This is a good introduction; however, by representing the outcomes as just “+” and “-” you greatly simply the range of possible utility functions, and so force SUDT to make some controversial decisions (basically to accept the counterfactual mugging). The key issue is that your decider can give no special preferences to good or bad outcomes in his own world (a world the decider knows he occupies) versus other worlds (ones which the decider knows he doesn’t occupy).

Suppose instead that the decider has an outcome space with four outcomes “+Me”, “-Me”, “+NotMe”, “-NotMe”. Here, “+Me” represents a good singularity which the decider himself will get to enjoy, as opposed to “-Me” which is a bad singularity (such as an unfriendly AI which tortures the decider for the next billion years). The outcomes “+NotMe” and “-NotMe” also represent positive and negative singularities, but in worlds which the decider himself doesn’t inhabit. Assume that u(+Me) > u(+NotMe) > u(-Me), and also that u(+NotMe) = u(-NotMe), because the decider doesn’t care about worlds that he doesn’t belong to (from the point of view of his decisions, it’s exactly like they don’t exist).

Then, in the counterfactual mugging, when approached by Omega, the decider knows he is in a world where the coin has fallen Heads, so he picks the policy which maximizes utility for such worlds: in short he chooses “H” rather than “T”. This increases the probability of -NotMe as opposed to +NotMe, but as we’ve seen, the decider doesn’t care about that.

Here’s a possible objection: By selecting “H”, the decider is condemning lots of other versions or analogues of himself (in other possible worlds where Omega didn’t approach him), and his utility function might care about this. On the other hand, he might also reason like this “Analogues of me still aren’t me: I still care much more about whether I get tortured than whether all those analogues do. I still pick H”.

In short, I don’t think SUDT (or UDT) by itself solves the problem of counterfactual mugging. Relative to one utility function it looks quite reasonable to accept the mugging, whereas relative to another utility function it is reasonable to reject it. Perhaps SUDT also needs to specify a rule for selecting utility functions (e.g. some sort of disinterested “veil of ignorance” on the decider’s identity, or an equivalent ban on utilities which sneak it in a selfish or self-interested term).
What links here?
- The sin of updating when you can change whether you exist by Benya (Feb 28, 2014, 1:25 AM; 17 points)

drnickbone Dec 13, 2013, 7:34 PM
3 points
in reply to: bramflakes’s comment on: Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 28, chapter 99-101
Quirrell might have been referring to his initial plan (as Voldemort) to end Harry’s life back when Harry was a baby. Quirrell/Voldemort could not have known about a dark ritual then, because he hadn’t created it.

I still don’t think the “dark ritual” hypothesis is very strong, because I can’t see why Quirrell would have done it deliberately, so it happened accidentally. It’s not clear whether “accidental” dark rituals are even possible in the HPMor universe, but if they are, Quirrell ought to be more careful to avoid them.

drnickbone Dec 13, 2013, 7:14 PM
3 points
in reply to: kilobug’s comment on: Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 28, chapter 99-101
If Quirrell wanted Harry dead, he would kill him.

Not strictly true: if Quirrell both wanted Harry dead and was able to kill him then he would kill him.

It seems to me we have to consider two hypotheses, each of which is problematic:.
1. Quirrell can’t kill Harry
2. Quirrell can kill Harry, but Harry is so supremely valuable that Quirrell is willing to risk the destruction of the whole universe (including himself, and all his horcruxes) to keep Harry alive.
Both hypotheses contain a puzzle. If Quirrell is unable to kill Harry, why is that? (One guess: his offering to spare Harry in exchange for Lily’s life created a binding dark ritual, and Quirrell can’t get out of it.) Alternatively, if Quirrell is able to kill Harry, what exactly makes Harry so supremely valuable? Using Harry in a resurrection ritual, or as a puppet ruler of magical Britain, don’t seem to be high enough value when measured against the risk, do they?

My initial thought was that Chapter 101 provides evidence against 1 and in favour of 2: if Quirrell’s problem is an inability to kill Harry, then Quirrell could just let the centaur do the job instead. But then, the Time-Turner evidence means that Quirrell already knows that the centaur’s attempt will fail anyway, so he might as well stop it himself (and stay in Harry’s favour). I still don’t think we can rule out hypothesis 1.

drnickbone Dec 13, 2013, 4:49 PM
6 points
in reply to: palladias’s comment on: Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 28, chapter 99-101
What puzzles me about this:
- The centaur foresees that Harry is “the end of the world”
- Quirrell has also heard that Harry is”the end of the world”
- Quirrell is really afraid of this (it’s the only credible threat to all his horcruxes)
- The centaur is conveniently about to kill Harry
But then Quirrell saves Harry’s life. Why?

Is the only reason because Quirrell has already seen future Harry in Chapter 100 (under the cloak), so knows that Harry has to make it out alive somehow, so he might as well do the saving?

drnickbone Dec 4, 2013, 9:32 PM
2 points
in reply to: Nornagest’s comment on: On Walmart, And Who Bears Responsibility For the Poor

Interesting reading, although I’m always leery of relying on a single meta-analysis of a politically charged subject.

My first reference above was more of a “meta-meta-analysis” since it surveys the results of several meta-analyses! At a high level, it is going to be quite difficult to argue that there really is a big impact on employment, but somehow all the analyses and meta-analyses have missed it. As I said, I found it surprising, but this is the full evidence base.

For the sake of argument, though, let’s take it as given that increasing the minimum wage has no or only a small effect on employment rates. Where’s the money coming from, and what would we expect that to do to the economy?

This is the main question addressed by the Schmitt paper. To quote the exec summary.

“The report reviews evidence on eleven possible adjustments to minimum-wage increases that may help to explain why the measured employment effects are so consistently small. The strongest evidence suggests that the most important channels of adjustment are: reductions in labor turnover; improvements in organizational efficiency; reductions in wages of higher earners (“wage compression”); and small price increases.”

One of the other hypotheses considered was a reduction in profits (which is what the toy model would suggest: the low-wage “Job 1” maximizes profits rather than productivity, and moving to “Job 2″ increases productivity but lowers profits). However, Schmitt found not many studies and not much evidence of this, except in the UK following introduction of the minimum wage from nothing. Again, I found that very surprising: if anyone is losing out by paying the minimum wage, you would expect it to be the Walmarts of the world. But not so, apparently.

drnickbone Dec 4, 2013, 8:58 PM
−2 points
in reply to: advael’s comment on: On Walmart, And Who Bears Responsibility For the Poor
OK, there seems to be a terminology difference between basic income which is unconditional and guaranteed minimum income which usually comes with conditions, such as willingness to work.

Somewhere up the thread we were discussing “guaranteed” income and also “basic minimum income” so I wasn’t clear which was meant.

Honestly, I just can’t see an unconditional minimum income being feasible at all in the English-speaking world: critics will brand it as a “layabouts charter” and no party with a serious desire to be elected will support it. Whereas a minimum income which a) is granted conditional on willingness to work and b) is still paid to those in work (so avoiding a high effective tax rate) looks much more feasible.

drnickbone Dec 4, 2013, 8:16 PM
2 points
in reply to: Nornagest’s comment on: On Walmart, And Who Bears Responsibility For the Poor
OK, a fair criticism of the “toy” model, which was simplified to make the point. There are always multiple choices of productivity and wage level, and big moves (more than doubling employee productivity, while simultaneously quadrupling the cost of labour) usually can’t happen quickly.

Back in the real world, I did a quick look at the economic evidence, and was surprised. The latest evidence base is that the minimum wage has surprisingly little effect on anything. It seems to have no discernible effect on employment levels—see here—but it has no clear net impact on training levels either—see here.

One problem is that minimum wages tend to be varied only marginally, so it is hard to see a big effect. However, the UK provides a more dramatic experiment, where minimum wages were abolished in the 1990s, then re-introduced a few years later. Some UK assessment here on employment and on training. Again, not a big impact in either case, though training levels apparently did increase among groups affected by the minimum wage. This suggests the toy model is not totally daft.

drnickbone Dec 4, 2013, 7:29 PM
−5 points
in reply to: advael’s comment on: On Walmart, And Who Bears Responsibility For the Poor
It’s an interesting point, though you seem to be assuming that the minimum income would be offered completely unconditionally, with no requirement to seek employment, and no penalty for refusing it. Real world benefit systems tend to come with strings, as this is far more popular than giving permanent handouts to people who could work but just don’t want to.

drnickbone Dec 4, 2013, 7:15 PM
0 points
in reply to: Nornagest’s comment on: On Walmart, And Who Bears Responsibility For the Poor
Someone downvoted your reply, Nornagest, which I really can’t understand: I upvoted it myself.

The parent is now at −2; one more down and it will disappear from view, and we will get a heavy tax for continuing.

What is happening here? Are we just not allowed to have discussions on this forum about the possible economic gains and costs of minimum wage or minimum income policy?

drnickbone Dec 4, 2013, 5:11 PM
−3 points
in reply to: DanielLC’s comment on: On Walmart, And Who Bears Responsibility For the Poor
Why a bad idea, though? I guess you are disputing this point:

(so discouraging low-productivity work, and incentivizing training for higher productivity work).

Here’s a simple model. Assume that full-time employees cannot live on less than $8 an hour (they starve, can’t pay rent etc.) Also assume that an employer can offer untrained staff two sorts of job:

Job 1 has very low productivity, total value of $6 per hour, but a pay-rate of $3 per hour. $3 a hour is too low to live on, but employees will accept it where that supplements a minimum guaranteed income.

Job 2 has higher productivity, total value of $14 per hour, but staff must be trained to do it, and because they now have transferable skills, the employer must offer $10 an hour to retain them. The training costs average at $2 per hour over the typical duration of the employment.

The employer offers staff Job 1 because that gives a higher profit ($3 per hour, rather than $2 per hour). Staff take it because $3 is better than nothing. But there is more economic value created if employers offer Job 2 instead. A minimum wage requires them to do that. You can argue the details, but that’s the general principle.

There is clearly a counter-argument that the minimum wage is a market intervention and can cause inefficiencies (it may result in some folks who just can’t be trained losing their $3 per hour jobs). But the counter to that counter-argument is that the minimum income guarantee is already a market intervention which is encouraging employers to offer Job 1 (as it allows employees to accept it). So a corrective intervention is needed.

drnickbone Dec 3, 2013, 7:42 PM
2 points
in reply to: DanielLC’s comment on: On Walmart, And Who Bears Responsibility For the Poor
It is of course possible to have both. Set a minimum income guarantee for everyone (so that even those who are not working, don’t starve), allow the minimum income to be retained by those in work (so avoiding a high effective tax rate on low incomes), and add a minimum wage as well (so discouraging low-productivity work, and incentivizing training for higher productivity work).

By the way, the major political value of describing Walmart as a “welfare queen” is that welfare recipients are stigmatised, and this line of rhetoric redirects the stigma (and tends to dilute it). It is unfair to Walmart, but perhaps no less fair than calling anyone a welfare queen.

drnickbone Nov 28, 2013, 12:05 AM
11 points
on: 2013 Less Wrong Census/Survey
Taken the survey, for the second time. Doesn’t feel like a year...

I’m a bit curious about the Prisoners’ Dilemma question. I co-operated, as my rationale was “Well, I’m unlikely to win anyway, and I don’t really want to spoil the prize for whoever does win, so C”. Not sure if that counts as a true PD...

drnickbone Oct 23, 2013, 1:02 PM
0 points
in reply to: Stuart_Armstrong’s comment on: Of all the SIA-doomsdays in the all the worlds...
OK, so your point is that while SIA itself favours hypotheses which make the 2013 box bigger, THOSE favoured hypotheses (very large multiverse, lots of habitable planets) also tend to make the box 2014 bigger. So we don’t change the expected ratio Size(2014)/Size(2013).

It is only if we have additional evidence constraining Size(2014) - or Size(Colonize Universe) - that we get a ratio shift.