draq

Karma: −79

draq 5 Nov 2010 18:57 UTC
0 points
in reply to: jimrandomh’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence

No Universally Compelling Arguments contains a proof that for every possible morality, there is a mind with volition to which it does not apply. Therefore, there is no absolute morality.

There is no universally compelling argument for morality as much as there is no universally compelling for reality. You can change the physical perception as well. But it does not necessary follow that there is no absolute reality.

I also have to correct my position: CEV is not absolute morality. Volition is rather a “reptor” or “sensor” of morality I made a conceptual mistake.

Can you formulate your thoughts value-free, that is without words like “profoundly stupid”, “important”. Because these words suggest that we should do something. If there is no universal morality, why do you postulate anything normative? Other than for fun.

ps I have to stop posting. First, I have to take time for thinking. Second, this temporary block is driving me insane.

draq 5 Nov 2010 18:47 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence

Again, it’s not that I don’t care about anything. I just happen to have a few core axioms, things that I care about for no reason. They don’t feel arbitrary to me—after all, I care about them a great deal! -- but I didn’t choose to care about them. I just do.

And you believe that other minds have different core believs?

Sure, and those are the claims I take the time to evaluate and debunk.

I think we should close the discussion and take some time thinking.

Please explain the relationship between G701-702 and G698-700.

“chance is low” or “chance is high” are not mere descriptive, they also contain values. chance is low --> probably safe to drive, high --> probably not, based on the more fundamental axiom that surviving is good. And “surviving is good” is not descriptive, it is normative because good is a value. you can also say instead: “you should survive”, which is a normative rule.

draq 4 Nov 2010 20:12 UTC
0 points
in reply to: David_Allen’s comment on: POLL: Reductionism
Thanks for the rephrasing. I would amend:
1. Weak scientific reductionist:
  c) concepts and theories in chemistry and biology are only useful high level approximations to physical models of the universe. They could be reduced to physical theories if b) does not apply.

draq 4 Nov 2010 19:32 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence

Since I’m Pavitra, it doesn’t really matter to me if G101 has a point; I care about it anyway.

So there is no normative rule that Pavitra (you) should care about G101. It just happens, it could also be different and it does not matter. That is what I call (moral) nihilism.

Don’t you ever ask why you should care (about anything, incl. yourself caring about things)? (I am not suggesting you becoming suicidal, but on the other hand, there is no normative rule against it, so… hm… I still won’t)

Their claims are basically noisy. If a large group of crazies started agreeing with each other, that might require looking into more carefully.

A large group of crazies agreeing: Ever heard of religion, homeopathy, TCM et cetera?

Not natively, no. That’s why it requires advocacy.

You care about things. I assume you care about your health. In that case, you don’t want to be in a crash. So you’ll evaluate whether you should get into a car. If you get into the car, you are an optimist, if not, you are a pessimist.

Again, why is important to advocate anything? -- Because you care about it. -- So what?

draq 4 Nov 2010 19:07 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
I like gensyms.

G101: Pavitra (me) cares about something.

What is the point in caring for G101?

At a certain point, the working model of reality begins to predict what the insane will claim to perceive and how those errors come about.

What if you can’t predict?

I advocate the G700 view, and assert that believing G698 or G699 interferes with believing G700.

That is not how your brain works (a rough guess). Your brain thinks either G698 or G699 and then comes out with a decision about either driving or not. This heuristic process is called optimism or pessimism.

draq 4 Nov 2010 18:26 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence

Why should I care about G695? In particular, why should I prefer it over G696, which is the CEV of all humans with volition alive in 2010, or over G697, which is the CEV of myself?

So your point is there is no point in caring for anything. Do you call yourself a nihilist?

I then investigate the two unrelated phenomena individually and eventually come to the conclusion that there is one reality between all humans, but a separate morality for each human.

Would you call yourself a naive realist? What about people on LSD, schizophrenics and religious people who see their Almighty Lord Spaghetti Monster in what you would call clouds. You surely mean that there is one reality between all humans that are “sane”.

Suppose you’re getting into a car, and you’re wondering whether you will get into a crash. The optimistic view is that you will definitely not crash. The pessimistic view is that you will definitely crash. Neither of these is right.

I would say, the optimistic view is saying “There is probably/hopefully no crash”. But don’t let us fight over words.

You’re constructing a universal CEV. It’s not an already-existing ontologically fundamental entity. It’s not a thing that actually exists.

Does CEV of humankind exists?

draq 4 Nov 2010 18:09 UTC
0 points
in reply to: jimrandomh’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
What do you think of Eliezer’s idea of “coherent extrapolated volition of humankind” and his position that FAI should optimise it?

draq 4 Nov 2010 17:58 UTC
1 point
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
What about the Baby-Eaters and the Super Happy People in the story Three Worlds Collide? Do they have anything you would call “humaneness”?

draq 4 Nov 2010 16:23 UTC
−1 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
Universal morality

You need to go read the sequences, and come back with specific counterarguments to the specific reasoning presented therein on the topics that you’re discussing.

I don’t think there is an easy way to make FAI.

Absolute morality is the coherent extrapolated volition of all entities with volition. Morality is based on values. In a universe where there are only insentient stones, there is no morality, and even if there are, they are meaningless. Morality exists only where there are values (things that we either like or dislike), or “volition”.

Reality and Morality

So the reason why you think there is a reality is because there is a strong consensus and the reason why you think that there is no morality is because there is no strong consensus?

Optimism and pessimism are incompatible with realism. If you’re not willing to believe that the universe works the way that it does in fact work, then you’re not qualified to work on potentially-world-destroying projects.

I don’t see what optimism or pessimism has to do with willingness to believe in an absolute reality. I only know that my knowledge is restricted, and within the boundaries of my ignorance, I can hope for the better or believe in the worse. If I’m omniscient, I will neither be optimistic or pessimistic. We are optimistic because we are ignorant, not the other way around, at least in my case.

And yet you seem to acknowledge that the output of the CEV function depends on whose volition it is asked to extrapolate. In what sense then is morality absolute, rather than relative to a certain kind of mind?

To be absolute, it has to apply to all mind that has volition.

(Incidentally, if you’ve been reading claims from Clippy that humane and paperclip-maximizing moralities are essentially compatible, then you should realize that e may have ulterior motives and may be arguing disingenuously. Sorry, Clippy.)

That is why I evaluate arguments based on other things than someone’s ulterior motives.

draq 4 Nov 2010 16:09 UTC
0 points
in reply to: jimrandomh’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
If you read a physics or chemistry textbook, then you’ll find a lot of words and only a few equations, whereas a mathematics textbook has much more equations and the words in the book are to explain the equations, whereas the words in a physics book are not only explaining the equations but the issues that the equations are explaining.

However, I haven’t fully thought about reductionism, so do you have any recommendations that I want to read?

My current two objections:

1. Computational

According to our current physical theories, it is impossible to predict the behaviour of any system larger than a dozen atoms, see Walter Kohn’s Nobel Lecture. We could eventually have a completely new theory, but that would be an optimistic hope.

2. Ontological

Physical objects have other qualities than mathematical objects. And values have other qualities than physical objects. Further elaboration needed.

It shouldn’t, because this is a straw man, not the argument that leads us to conclude that there isn’t a single absolute morality.

It is not a straw man, because I am not attacking any position. I think I was misunderstood, as I said.

draq 4 Nov 2010 15:54 UTC
1 point
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
When I use the word morality, then I certainly don’t mean any rules of conduct.

What is your defintion of human morality?

draq 3 Nov 2010 21:05 UTC
−3 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
What if the coherent extrapolated volition is the death of all people, that is, the end of all volitions?

draq 3 Nov 2010 20:52 UTC
−4 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
Physical and mathematical objects

Chemists and physicists tell us which mathematical objects we’re made out of. The used to think it was integers, but it turns out it wasn’t.

If the physical world can be fully reduced to mathematics, we don’t need chemists and physicist to tell us which mathematical objects we’re made out of. A mathematician would know that, unless there is something about an electron that can not be fully reduced to mathematics.

We use mathematics to describe physical objects, but physical objects are not mathematical objects. We use languages to describe physical objects, but physical objects are not words. Why are things mathematical and not lingual? Is it because the mathematical description yields better predictions?

Theories and what theories describe

Would you agree that value system is as absolute as the physical world if we can mathematise our normative theories as much as we have mathematised our physical theories?

No, what follows from the hypothetical is that it would be possible to hold meaningful discussions about our normative theories, rather than just saying words. A theory can be rigorously well-defined and also wrong.

I think you are missing the point. A physical theory can be wrong, that, I guess, does not shake your belief in an absolute reality. A normative theory, even mathematised, can also be wrong, but why should it shake my belief in an absolute morality?

Reductionism

Not quite, but a near miss. I’m a reductionist.

I am fine with that. As long as you believe in qualia as you believe in cars and trees, then we have a base from which we can work on, without bothering the fundaments too much. I think reductionism is wrong, but that’s not the discussion here.

From a reductionist point of view, the absolute morality would be a part of the absolute reality, with the mere difference that values have different qualities (no spatial extension, for example) than cars and trees.

Two models

Let me try again:

| reality | ---> | senses | ----> | perception of reality |

| morality | --> | moral intuition | ---> | perception of morality |

or

| senses | ----> | perception of reality |

| moral intuition | ---> | perception of morality |

Again, why is one model better than the other one?

We will die anyway.

No. If you do that, everyone will die. “Good at killing other AIs” does not even remotely imply “morally good according to human values”. Morality is harder than that.

It is not necessarily that evolution gets us better physical theories or normative theories. I was simply optimistic. It is possible that people believing in a spaghetti monster kill all rational people, as much as it is possible that an AI has a wrong normative theory and thus kill all human beings. Or, the absolute morality demands our death. Or maybe the LHC will create a black hole that kills us within 24 hours. In all cases, bad luck. We will die anyway. On the longer run, the chance of us irreversibly dying at any single point of time is greater than us living forever.

Concerning Coherent Extrapolated Volition

I would probably have saved a lot of discussion, had I read the article first (and learned of the rationalist taboo). :)

I think what Eliezer calls “coherent extrapolated volition” is what I call “absolute morality. The “ability to extrapolate volition” is what I call “empathy”. I don’t agree with his goal “initial dynamic should implement the coherent extrapolated volition of humankind” , though. First, what is the defintion of humankind? This is a core problem for the Prime Intellect in The Metamorphosis.

I think, the goal of the intial dynamic should be ” to extrapolate volition of all entities that have or can express volitions.”

draq 3 Nov 2010 19:54 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Sniffnoy’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
In that sense, everything could be a mathematical object, including qualia. We just haven’t identified it.

Also, the concept of actual-but-still-unknown-X and previously-hypothesized-X can be applied to morality in terms of actual-but-still-unknown-norm and previously-hypothesized-norm.

draq 2 Nov 2010 17:04 UTC
−4 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
1a.

An electron is not a mathematical object. If it were, then we wouldn’t need chemists and physicsts, but only mathematicians. A mathematical object does have any behaviour, as much as a word in a language does not have any behaviour.

Mathematics and logic are tautalogical systems with defined symbols and operations. We use mathematics to describe the physical world as much as we use language to describe the moral world (value system), e.g. in behavioural biology and psychology.

Would you agree that value system is as absolute as the physical world if we can mathematise our normative theories as much as we have mathematised our physical theories?

1b.

An electron is not a mathematical object. Let’s say, equation (1) describes the behaviour of an electron according to our current knowledge. Then you might say, the electron is a “mathematical object” contained in (1).

But what if equation (2) is found, that better describes an electron’s behaviour? What happens with the “mathematical object”?

2.

I consider p-zombies as capable of having things that matter to them

What is your defintion of “something matters?”. As in “it matters to a stone up in the air to fall down to earth.”? In that case, our defintions vary.

You seem to be a logical positivist, which is an incomplete world view. If your mind works the same way as mine does, then you should know that qualia exists. It is like if you walk up to a tree and says “No, there is no tree in front of me.” and then sidestep it.

3.

I would in principle agree with your diagramm of moral intuition. Let me present you two models:

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

A. reality—senses—perception of reality

morality—moral intuition—perception of morality

B. evolution of the brain—senses—perception of reality

evolution of the brain—moral intuition—perception of morality

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Why do you cherry-pick from the two categories? Is it because science is more mathematical, has a methodology that is more precise, and has a greater intersubjective consensus? Why does any of these make reality real and morality relative?

For more information on model 3B, look up “evolutionary epistomology”.

Application case

I want to apply my theory of absolute moralily to the design of Friendly AI.

Unless we can mathematise our value system, how can we make an AI friendly? We know Asimov’s Laws of Robotics, but these laws are in the inprecise formulation of natural language. What do “injury”, “human being”, “robot”, “harm”, “obey”, “protection” and other words mean? The outcome of such ambiquities is the defining plot element of The Metamorphosis and “I, Robot” (2004 film).

My solution: Design AIs with empathy and access to our intersubjective consensus of morality. If our current normative theories aren’t completely wrong, then the absolute good does not require the annihilation of the human species.

You might say that having empathy does not automatically make an AI good, because it may have a wrong normative theory.

Therefore, make many AIs, let them evolve and battle it out. The good will win vs. evil, because being moral, that is having better normative theories, increases biological fitness. So the more moral an AI is, the greater its chance to survive.

draq 31 Oct 2010 21:19 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
Sorry, I am developing my ideas in the process of the discussion and I probably have amended and changed my position several times thanks to the debate with the LW community. The biggest problem is that I haven’t defined a clear set of vocabulary (because I haven’t had a clear position yet), so there is a lot of ambiguity and misunderstanding which is solely my fault.

Here is a short summary of my current positions. They may not result in a coherent system. I’m working on that.

1. Value system / morality is science

Imagine an occult Pythagorean who believes that only mathematical objects exist. So he/she wouldn’t understand the meaning of electrons and gravitational forces because they cannot be fully expressed in mathematics. He/she would understand the Coulomb’s law and Newton’s law of gravitation, but a physicist needs more than these mathematical equations for the understanding of physics.

That is the difference between physicists and chemists on one side and mathematicians and string theorists (I have not the slightest idea about string theory, so regard this part as my modest attempt of humour) on the other side.

Analogously, you need to understand the value system to understand and possibly predict the actions of value agents (humans, animals, maybe AIs). Maybe the value system can be mathematicised, or not.

But it would be a scientific explanation. I agree with you.

2. Something matters to me

We all have values. You asked whether the understanding of the value system has any external consequences or is the benefit purely a state of mind. I wonder why does it matter to you to know the difference?

You may answer that thinking of these problems makes you biologically fitter and if you don’t ask these questions, your kind will die out and those questions won’t be asked.

But when you asked the question, you did not consider your biological fitness. And if you considered your biological fitness, then why does biological fitness matters to you? There is at least one thing that matters to you (assuming you are not a p-zombie), so at least the desire, “something matters to me”, is real, as real as your knowledge of the world.

Assuming you are not a psychopath, your only desire is not your own survival, but, being empathetic, also the well-being of your fellow animals, human and sentient beings. And you know that your fellow human beings are empathetic (or acting as if they are empathetic) as well. Ergo you can establish an intersubjective consensus and some common ground what the good is.

3. Epistomology

Mental phenomena are of different qualities than natural phenomena. A desire is more than neuronal processes. You may read all the books on neurobiology, but you may learn more on desires by reading a single book by Nabokov. (You may think that you don’t care, then please go back to point 2.). From here continue with the text diagramm.

ps The computer that you need to model the quantum states of a brain would be bigger than the universe, see (Kohn’s Nobel Lecture)[http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1998/kohn-lecture.pdf].

draq 30 Oct 2010 20:45 UTC
0 points
in reply to: nhamann’s comment on: What is the Archimedean point of morality?
Are you asking me to use a certain LW-inside vocabulary? In that case, a dictionary would be helpful. Which specific word or phrase is not clear to you?

Or are you holding a logical positivist position that some words or context does not have any meaning at all?

draq 30 Oct 2010 20:35 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
You walk up to the fridge, get out a banana and eat it.

If I am Laplace’s demon, I might be able to predict your doing (or not). But science does not explain what hunger and desire is, it can describe it using its own language, but the scientific language does not include any words to describe values. Hunger and desire have more qualities than just neuronal processes.

Anyway, the difference might be pointless, because Laplace’s demon does not exist and we can’t predict in principle anything more complicated than a dozen atoms, unless we have a fundamentally new theory of physics. In that case, the only thing we have left is normative/value theories that help us to predict someone’s action.

draq 30 Oct 2010 19:51 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Pavitra’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
I did read the article “No Universal Argument” you linked to and couldn’t find any convincing rebuttal to my arguments.

I just read “Making Beliefs Pay Rent” and if I got it right, then it says that science is good (and absolute) because it can predict things while normative theories don’t. That is a good point.

My belief in an absolute morality gives me the foundation to enquire moral problems. I’ll try to figure out what the “absoulute good” is and try to life my life according to that.

We can predict and explain the “decision-making” of inanimate objects using scientific theories. We can understand the decision-making of moral agents (humans) using normative theories (we might be able to predict their actions using scientific theories, but we won’t understand or *explain” it without normative theories).

What about alien intelligence? If we can establish an intersubjective consensus with them and we realise that they have a value system that we can understand, then we can use our own system of normative theories to understand and explain their “decision-making”.

If we can’t establish an intersubjective consensus with them, then we might be able to predict their actions using scientific theories, but we won’t be able to understand their “motives”. They would act according to an absolute AI-morality, to which we have no access lacking the intersubjective consensus with them.

To recap and rectify my argument: Intersubjective consensus of the physical world leads us to believe in an absolute physical reality. Intersubjective consensus of the moral/value world leads us to believe in an absolute morality. No intersubjective consensus—no belief in absolute whatever.

Maybe, and I believe, the moral world is an emergent property of the physical world. Thus, we might be able to use physical theories to predict the actions of moral agents within the physical world, but we won’t be able to fully understand it only using physical theories since these don’t capture the emergent properties (values, desires, dislikes, et cetera).

Therefore, morality is not as absolute as reality, but it is analogously absolute. (That is/might be a correction to my current position.)

So, if alien intelligence has a value system that we can understand, then we live within the same absolute morality. If alien intelligence acts based on some other emergent properties we cannot understand, then well, bad luck. (Another additon to my current position, thanks to this discussion.)

I can’t explain you to you. Point at your feet and say aloud, “You are here.”

That’s unfortunate, I thought you saw where I was coming from.

draq 29 Oct 2010 21:41 UTC
0 points
in reply to: David_Allen’s comment on: Levels of Intelligence
What I meant to say is “morality is absolute as reality.” I hope that clears everything.

Given that I experience God or anything supernatural empirically and I can reasonably exclude that I am suffering from hallucinations, then it is more probable for me to believe that the phenomena was supernatural rather than an improbable quantum mechanical phenonemon. Maybe what I call God is actually Frud. Maybe God “is a tuna sandwich I once made that had a special property, it created the universe, past and future.” I don’t expect to realise all of God’s properties from a single experience.

Predictive power is not always required. Historians have quite a problem predicting things based on what they read on Caesar. You can’t thus say that there are no historical facts (fact as factual as in “objective” news reporting).

You point out a context that does not require predictive power, but you have not shown that this context is equivalent to testing for God’s existence empirically. Without a common context, your example is irrelevant to the issue.

I don’t get you. What is your understanding of “testing for God’s existence empirically?”