No-Nonsense Metaethics

Years ago, I wrote an un­finished se­quence of posts called “No-Non­sense Me­taethics.” My last post, Plu­ral­is­tic Mo­ral Re­duc­tion­ism, said I would next ex­plore “em­pathic metaethics,” but I never got around to writ­ing those posts. Re­cently, I wrote a high-level sum­mary of some ini­tial thoughts on “em­pathic metaethics” in sec­tion 6.1.2 of a re­port pre­pared for my em­ployer, the Open Philan­thropy Pro­ject. With my em­ployer’s per­mis­sion, I’ve adapted that sec­tion for pub­li­ca­tion here, so that it can serve as the long-over­due con­clud­ing post in my se­quence on metaethics.

Head­ing Toward: No-Non­sense Metaethics

What is Me­taethics?

Con­cep­tual Anal­y­sis and Mo­ral Theory

Plu­ral­is­tic Mo­ral Reductionism

Quick thoughts on em­pathic metaethics