IIRC (can’t find sources right now) common practice has been to stop electricity for some time, then when international pressure increases supply it interminently.
Yeah, I don’t understand the water situation myself. I hear Hamas complaining about electricity, and not about water, so it seems to be fine for now.
About casualties: That’s extremely difficult to answer in the best conditions, depends on the way Israel will do it, and requires actual expertise and classified information which I lack. I will try to give you the way I think about this question.
The most similar war would be Operation Protective Edge, in 2014. Gazan forces were approximated at 25,000 people. According to Israel [1] in that war 2,125 Gazans were killed, of which 36% were civilians, 44% combatants, and 20% uncategorized males aged 16–50 (probably some are militants, some civilians and some opportunistic attackers who did not formally belong to any organization). Israel suffered 67 soldiers killed. However, the cities themselves were not invaded, and Hamas’s vast bunker system was not directly confronted. Most palestinian casualties were from air strikes.
The most similar purely urban battle I can think about is the battle of Jenin (AFAIK the Israeli version of the events is the correct one). It consisted of 1000 Israeli soldiers vs 300 Palestinians, in a 40k people city. it ended with 23 Israeli soldiers killed, ~25-40 Palestinian militants killed, and 15-25 civilians killed. Direct multiplication would suggest 2,300 Israeli dead, 2,500 − 4,000 militants, and 1,500 - 2,500 civilians killed. In practice it would be more, since Gaza is better fortified and Hamas would not have anywhere to flee, unlike in Jenin.
An additional possibility is the usage of siege tatics. It seems siege directed against civilians is prohibited, but it’s possible if you let civilians out. Therefore, if Israel manages to establish a humanitarian corridor to Egypt where Gazans can flee, without too many casualties for itself beyond the 1,000+ it already has. I find it very unlikely we’ll have a siege without such corridor.
The truth will lie somewhere between airstrikes, urban fighting and siege. I don’t know how Israel will combine the three, and it’s probably being decided right now. We’ll have to wait and see.
[1] I use Israel’s figures because Hamas’ are trivially unreliable, and UN Human Rights Council is an extremely biased body. For instance, after the recent attack on Israel, they held a moment of silence in memory of lives “lost in Palestinian territories and elsewhere”.
Thanks for the response, especially including specific examples.
My motivation for asking these questions, is to anticipate that which will be obvious and of greatest humanitarian concern in hindsight, say in a year.
This is a scenario that I think is moderately probable, that I’m worried about:
Part 1, most certain: Israeli airstrikes continue, unclear if they’re still using their knocking system much. Due in part to deliberate Hamas mixing of combatants and non-combatants, numbers of civilian casualties rise over time.
Part 2, less certain: Israel continues to withhold or significantly restrict electricity and/or food/medical supplies. Civilian casualties rise over time.
Part 3, less certain: Israel proceeds with an invasion/occupation of Gaza. Goals could be restricted to killing known members of Hamas, destroying Hamas materiel, rescuing hostages, or they could be expanded to some kind of occupation or even resettlement objectives.
With part 2 and 3, the possibilities for non-combatant casualties seem largely open ended. The results (if these things happen) will depend not just on Israel’s conduct, but also the reaction from Hamas and the general Palestinian population.
I think that those who are able to consider the situation dispassionately, both inside and outside of Israel, should be clear that the maximally aggressive Israeli response would be tragic and catastrophic. The question, therefore, is how much restraint can be shown; and to a lesser extent, if the response can do any good. As a backdrop to all this, I also consider that it’s as yet uncertain whether, among other considerations, there could be more attacks against Israel yet to come in the near term.
I understand that you might not have much to say about all this since it’s largely speculation, just thought I’d throw in my thoughts about the situation.
Part 1: I agree, it seems they don’t use the Roofknock Protocol for now, and that will be the main source of civilian casualties. It’s a tragedy, but not actually a problem by law of war (see Jay Donde’s post).
Part 2: I generally agree. I don’t think actual food shortage will be a problem (5%), electricity might (10-33%, very uncertain) but I don’t think will cause many casualties by itself. We live in a warm country, and hospitals (and Hamas operatives) have emergency reserves.
Part 3: I agree, and think it depends a lot on Egyptian refugee policy.
Additional possibility is a second front in Lebanon, which adds orders of magnitude more missiles, which are also stronger and more accurate. Israeli civilian casualties will quickly rise, not to mention the possibility of them trying similar tactics to those Hamas tried last Saturday (even though that will probably be less effective, since Israel is on high alert).
Of course such scenario will also deeply impact Lebanon and its citizens.
As for your later point, I think Israel is trying to topple Hamas’s regime, one way or another. The region around Gaza is populated by 70,000 people, who will not stay there if there’s a risk for attacks like the last one. I am not sure whether it will be done by completely occupying the strip, a siege, or something completely different, but I don’t think we’ll return to status quo unless Israel tries and fails to do that.
About the Lebanon situation, I’m much more sure that it will make Palestinian casualties rise than that it will make Israeli casualties rise. My impression (from public information) is that Israel is capable of destroying both Hammas and Hizballah pretty quickly if it is willing to play dirty enough. And my impression about Israel is that it care about ethics, but not enough to allow an existential threat to exist. So in such situation I expect Israel to be super aggressive against Gaza in order to end it quickly and focus on Lebanon.
I don’t expect it, since historically Israel let humanitarian supplies in during wars. I also sincerely hope it will continue do that during this war.
IIRC (can’t find sources right now) common practice has been to stop electricity for some time, then when international pressure increases supply it interminently.
Yeah, I don’t understand the water situation myself. I hear Hamas complaining about electricity, and not about water, so it seems to be fine for now.
About casualties: That’s extremely difficult to answer in the best conditions, depends on the way Israel will do it, and requires actual expertise and classified information which I lack. I will try to give you the way I think about this question.
The most similar war would be Operation Protective Edge, in 2014. Gazan forces were approximated at 25,000 people. According to Israel [1] in that war 2,125 Gazans were killed, of which 36% were civilians, 44% combatants, and 20% uncategorized males aged 16–50 (probably some are militants, some civilians and some opportunistic attackers who did not formally belong to any organization). Israel suffered 67 soldiers killed. However, the cities themselves were not invaded, and Hamas’s vast bunker system was not directly confronted. Most palestinian casualties were from air strikes.
The most similar purely urban battle I can think about is the battle of Jenin (AFAIK the Israeli version of the events is the correct one). It consisted of 1000 Israeli soldiers vs 300 Palestinians, in a 40k people city. it ended with 23 Israeli soldiers killed, ~25-40 Palestinian militants killed, and 15-25 civilians killed. Direct multiplication would suggest 2,300 Israeli dead, 2,500 − 4,000 militants, and 1,500 - 2,500 civilians killed. In practice it would be more, since Gaza is better fortified and Hamas would not have anywhere to flee, unlike in Jenin.
An additional possibility is the usage of siege tatics. It seems siege directed against civilians is prohibited, but it’s possible if you let civilians out. Therefore, if Israel manages to establish a humanitarian corridor to Egypt where Gazans can flee, without too many casualties for itself beyond the 1,000+ it already has. I find it very unlikely we’ll have a siege without such corridor.
The truth will lie somewhere between airstrikes, urban fighting and siege. I don’t know how Israel will combine the three, and it’s probably being decided right now. We’ll have to wait and see.
[1] I use Israel’s figures because Hamas’ are trivially unreliable, and UN Human Rights Council is an extremely biased body. For instance, after the recent attack on Israel, they held a moment of silence in memory of lives “lost in Palestinian territories and elsewhere”.
Thanks for the response, especially including specific examples.
My motivation for asking these questions, is to anticipate that which will be obvious and of greatest humanitarian concern in hindsight, say in a year.
This is a scenario that I think is moderately probable, that I’m worried about:
Part 1, most certain: Israeli airstrikes continue, unclear if they’re still using their knocking system much. Due in part to deliberate Hamas mixing of combatants and non-combatants, numbers of civilian casualties rise over time.
Part 2, less certain: Israel continues to withhold or significantly restrict electricity and/or food/medical supplies. Civilian casualties rise over time.
Part 3, less certain: Israel proceeds with an invasion/occupation of Gaza. Goals could be restricted to killing known members of Hamas, destroying Hamas materiel, rescuing hostages, or they could be expanded to some kind of occupation or even resettlement objectives.
With part 2 and 3, the possibilities for non-combatant casualties seem largely open ended. The results (if these things happen) will depend not just on Israel’s conduct, but also the reaction from Hamas and the general Palestinian population.
I think that those who are able to consider the situation dispassionately, both inside and outside of Israel, should be clear that the maximally aggressive Israeli response would be tragic and catastrophic. The question, therefore, is how much restraint can be shown; and to a lesser extent, if the response can do any good. As a backdrop to all this, I also consider that it’s as yet uncertain whether, among other considerations, there could be more attacks against Israel yet to come in the near term.
I understand that you might not have much to say about all this since it’s largely speculation, just thought I’d throw in my thoughts about the situation.
Part 1: I agree, it seems they don’t use the Roofknock Protocol for now, and that will be the main source of civilian casualties. It’s a tragedy, but not actually a problem by law of war (see Jay Donde’s post).
Part 2: I generally agree. I don’t think actual food shortage will be a problem (5%), electricity might (10-33%, very uncertain) but I don’t think will cause many casualties by itself. We live in a warm country, and hospitals (and Hamas operatives) have emergency reserves.
Part 3: I agree, and think it depends a lot on Egyptian refugee policy.
Additional possibility is a second front in Lebanon, which adds orders of magnitude more missiles, which are also stronger and more accurate. Israeli civilian casualties will quickly rise, not to mention the possibility of them trying similar tactics to those Hamas tried last Saturday (even though that will probably be less effective, since Israel is on high alert).
Of course such scenario will also deeply impact Lebanon and its citizens.
As for your later point, I think Israel is trying to topple Hamas’s regime, one way or another. The region around Gaza is populated by 70,000 people, who will not stay there if there’s a risk for attacks like the last one. I am not sure whether it will be done by completely occupying the strip, a siege, or something completely different, but I don’t think we’ll return to status quo unless Israel tries and fails to do that.
About the Lebanon situation, I’m much more sure that it will make Palestinian casualties rise than that it will make Israeli casualties rise. My impression (from public information) is that Israel is capable of destroying both Hammas and Hizballah pretty quickly if it is willing to play dirty enough. And my impression about Israel is that it care about ethics, but not enough to allow an existential threat to exist. So in such situation I expect Israel to be super aggressive against Gaza in order to end it quickly and focus on Lebanon.
I agree it will also affect Gaza. Disagree about the effect on Israeli casualties.