I think so. I’m not sure. I would need to think about it some more.
I can certainly see some value in some of the thinking around e-prime. And I made a point out of the linguistics at the beginning of the talk, but mostly I did that just as a way of starting my talk with something familiar.
In distinguishing being the way he does, I don’t think Heidegger is really so interested in the meaning variations of the linguistic form. He is more interested in what our behaviour and experience silently indicate ie. what is in the background that makes different forms of inteligibility viable.
One way of thinking about that is as a set of standards for what counts as being—one of the points Heidegger is making in B&T is that there are at least three different kinds of sets of standards which are embedded in our behaviour and experience, which are 1. self-sufficient substances, 2. equipment and 3. ourselves.
So, for example with equipment, I behave as though a tea-mug is, and in particular I behave as though it is a tea-mug—I don’t behave as though it is a piece of fired clay—I might be careful not to drop, but that is subsumed into it being for what it is for—and I don’t experience it as a piece of fired clay. I experience it as a tea-mug… But not even that really… I just pick it up and pour boiling water in it. And more interestingly, the more competent I am with tea-making, the more transparent the tea-mug becomes in my experience.
One thing I certainly don’t need to do, unless I am doing philosophy, or something is not working, is think about the tea-mug. Rather we live in a condition of skilful absorbed coping, dealing transparently with the equipment with which we are familiar. We always find ourselves already in this world, engaged in some activity or another.
I think so. I’m not sure. I would need to think about it some more.
I can certainly see some value in some of the thinking around e-prime. And I made a point out of the linguistics at the beginning of the talk, but mostly I did that just as a way of starting my talk with something familiar.
In distinguishing being the way he does, I don’t think Heidegger is really so interested in the meaning variations of the linguistic form. He is more interested in what our behaviour and experience silently indicate ie. what is in the background that makes different forms of inteligibility viable.
One way of thinking about that is as a set of standards for what counts as being—one of the points Heidegger is making in B&T is that there are at least three different kinds of sets of standards which are embedded in our behaviour and experience, which are 1. self-sufficient substances, 2. equipment and 3. ourselves.
So, for example with equipment, I behave as though a tea-mug is, and in particular I behave as though it is a tea-mug—I don’t behave as though it is a piece of fired clay—I might be careful not to drop, but that is subsumed into it being for what it is for—and I don’t experience it as a piece of fired clay. I experience it as a tea-mug… But not even that really… I just pick it up and pour boiling water in it. And more interestingly, the more competent I am with tea-making, the more transparent the tea-mug becomes in my experience.
One thing I certainly don’t need to do, unless I am doing philosophy, or something is not working, is think about the tea-mug. Rather we live in a condition of skilful absorbed coping, dealing transparently with the equipment with which we are familiar. We always find ourselves already in this world, engaged in some activity or another.