(Tangent: Are you a moral anti-realist? If so… how?)
I have been in the past and I still assign a significant (but currently less than 0.5) probability to the proposition. I was actually referring to my stance towards scientific theories, which is heavily influenced by Bas van Fraassen.
What are your moral anti-realist fall back arguments? I ask because I don’t really understand moral anti-realism and would like pointers towards any of the better arguments for it.
Re scientific anti-realism, I’m surprised that van Fraassen’s approach didn’t gain popularity until van Fraassen in 1980; I figured something like it would’ve become the standard position directly following the fall of logical positivism. I don’t understand why it can take decades for certain clearly reasonable, clearly under-represented perspectives to gain any footing in academic philosophy. Is there really a dearth of proponents, or is the Matthew effect very strong, or...? Anyway, Scientific realism seems clearly naive—so I suppose there must arguments in its favor that I’m just not aware of...? Then again I’m really not impressed by the philosophers of mind who make scientific-realist-like arguments, so maybe I shouldn’t expect to like scientifc realist philosophers of science either? (E.g. at first blush I really don’t like the miracle argument.)
(Tangent: Are you a moral anti-realist? If so… how?)
I have been in the past and I still assign a significant (but currently less than 0.5) probability to the proposition. I was actually referring to my stance towards scientific theories, which is heavily influenced by Bas van Fraassen.
What are your moral anti-realist fall back arguments? I ask because I don’t really understand moral anti-realism and would like pointers towards any of the better arguments for it.
Re scientific anti-realism, I’m surprised that van Fraassen’s approach didn’t gain popularity until van Fraassen in 1980; I figured something like it would’ve become the standard position directly following the fall of logical positivism. I don’t understand why it can take decades for certain clearly reasonable, clearly under-represented perspectives to gain any footing in academic philosophy. Is there really a dearth of proponents, or is the Matthew effect very strong, or...? Anyway, Scientific realism seems clearly naive—so I suppose there must arguments in its favor that I’m just not aware of...? Then again I’m really not impressed by the philosophers of mind who make scientific-realist-like arguments, so maybe I shouldn’t expect to like scientifc realist philosophers of science either? (E.g. at first blush I really don’t like the miracle argument.)