But then, Wei Dai’s posting was intemperate, as is your comment. I mention this not to excuse mine, just to point out how easily this happens.
Using the word “intemperate” in this way is a remarkable dodge. Wei Dai’s comment was entirely within the scope of the (admittedly extreme) hypothetical under discussion. Your comment contained a paragraph composed solely of vile personal insult and slanted misrepresentation of Wei Dai’s statements. The tone of my response was deliberate and quite restrained relative to how I felt.
This may be partly the dynamics of the online medium, but in the present case I think it is also because we are dealing in fantasy here, and fantasy always has to be more extreme than reality, to make up for its own unreality.
Huh? You’re “not excusing” the extremity of your interpersonal behavior on the grounds that the topic was fictional, and fiction is more extreme than reality? And then go on to explain that you don’t behave similarly toward Eliezer with respect to his position on TORTURE vs SPECKS because that topic is even more fictional?
Is this rationality, or the politics of two-year-olds with nukes?
Is this a constructive point, or just more gesturing?
As for the rest of your comment: Thank you! This is the discussion I wanted to be reading all along. Aside from a general feeling that you’re still not really trying to be fair, my remaining points are mercifully non-meta. To dampen political distractions, I’ll refer to the nuke-holding country as H, and a nuke-developing country as D.
You’re very focused on Wei Dai’s statement about backward induction, but I think you’re missing a key point: His strategy does not depend on D reasoning the way he expects them to, it’s just heavily optimized for this outcome. I believe he’s right to say that backward induction should convince D to comply, in the sense that it is in their own best interest to do so.
Or perhaps they can be superrational and precommit to developing their programme regardless of what threats you make? Then rationally, you must see that it would therefore be futile to make such threats.
Don’t see how this follows. If both countries precommit, D gets bombed until it halts or otherwise cannot continue development. While this is not H’s preferred outcome, H’s entire strategy is predicated on weighing irreversible nuclear proliferation and its consequences more heavily than the millions of lives lost in the event of a suicidal failure to comply. In other words, D doesn’t wield sufficient power in this scenario to affect H’s decision, while H holds sufficient power to skew local incentives toward mutually beneficial outcomes.
Speaking of nuclear proliferation and its consequences, you’ve been pretty silent on this topic considering that preventing proliferation is the entire motivation for Wei Dai’s strategy. Talking about “murdering millions” without at least framing it alongside the horror of proliferation is not productive.
How are you going to launch those nukes, anyway?
Practical considerations like this strike me as by far the best arguments against extreme, theory-heavy strategies. Messy real-world noise can easily make a high-stakes gambit more trouble than it’s worth.
Is this rationality, or the politics of two-year-olds with nukes?
Is this a constructive point, or just more gesturing?
It is a gesture concluding a constructive point.
You’re very focused on Wei Dai’s statement about backward induction, but I think you’re missing a key point: His strategy does not depend on D reasoning the way he expects them to, it’s just heavily optimized for this outcome. I believe he’s right to say that backward induction should convince D to comply, in the sense that it is in their own best interest to do so.
This is a distinction without a difference. If H bombs D, H has lost (and D has lost more).
If both countries precommit, D gets bombed until it halts or otherwise cannot continue development.
That depends on who precommits “first”. That’s a problematic concept for rational actors who have plenty of time to model each others’ possible strategies in advance of taking action. If H, without even being informed of it by D, considers this possible precommitment strategy of D, is it still rational for H to persist and threaten D anyway? Or perhaps H can precommit to ignoring such a precommitment by D? Or should D already have anticipated H’s original threat and backed down in advance of the threat ever having been made? I am reminded of the Forbidden Topic. Counterfactual blackmail isn’t just for superintelligences. As I asked before, does the decision theory exist yet to handle self-modifying agents modelling themselves and others, demonstrating how real actions can arise from this seething mass of virtual possibilities?
Then also, in what you dismiss as “messy real-world noise”, there may be a lot of other things D might do, such as fomenting insurrection in H, or sharing their research with every other country besides H (and blaming foreign spies), or assassinating H’s leader, or doing any and all of these while overtly appearing to back down.
The moment H makes that threat, the whole world is H’s enemy. H has declared a war that it hopes to win by the mere possession of overwhelming force.
Speaking of nuclear proliferation and its consequences, you’ve been pretty silent on this topic considering that preventing proliferation is the entire motivation for Wei Dai’s strategy. Talking about “murdering millions” without at least framing it alongside the horror of proliferation is not productive.
I look around at the world since WWII and fail to see this horror. I look at Wei Dai’s strategy and see the horror. loqi remarked about Everett branches, but imagining the measure of the wave function where the Cold War ended with nuclear conflagration fails to convince me of anything.
This is a distinction without a difference. If H bombs D, H has lost
This assumption determines (or at least greatly alters) the debate, and you need to make a better case for it. If H really “loses” by bombing D (meaning H considers this outcome less preferable than proliferation), then H’s threat is not credible, and the strategy breaks down, no exotic decision theory necessary. Looks like a crucial difference to me.
That depends on who precommits “first”. [...]
This entire paragraph depends on the above assumption. If I grant you that assumption and (artificially) hold constant H’s intent to precommit, then we’ve entered the realm of bluffing, and yes, the game tree gets pathological.
loqi remarked about Everett branches, but imagining the measure of the wave function where the Cold War ended with nuclear conflagration fails to convince me of anything.
My mention of Everett branches was an indirect (and counter-productive) way of accusing you of hindsight bias.
Your talk of “convincing you” is distractingly binary. Do you admit that the severity and number of close calls in the Cold War is relevant to this discussion, and that these are positively correlated with the underlying justification for Wei Dai’s strategy? (Not necessarily its feasibility!)
I look around at the world since WWII and fail to see this horror. I look at Wei Dai’s strategy and see the horror.
Let’s set aside scale and comparisons for a moment, because your position looks suspiciously one-sided. You fail to see the horror of nuclear proliferation? If I may ask, what is your estimate for the probability that a nuclear weapon will be deployed in the next 100 years? Did you even ask yourself this question, or are you just selectively attending to the low-probability horrors of Wei Dai’s strategy?
Then also, in what you dismiss as “messy real-world noise”
Emphasis mine. You are compromised. Please take a deep breath (really!) and re-read my comment. I was not dismissing your point in the slightest, I was in fact stating my belief that it exemplified a class of particularly effective counter-arguments in this context.
Using the word “intemperate” in this way is a remarkable dodge. Wei Dai’s comment was entirely within the scope of the (admittedly extreme) hypothetical under discussion. Your comment contained a paragraph composed solely of vile personal insult and slanted misrepresentation of Wei Dai’s statements. The tone of my response was deliberate and quite restrained relative to how I felt.
Huh? You’re “not excusing” the extremity of your interpersonal behavior on the grounds that the topic was fictional, and fiction is more extreme than reality? And then go on to explain that you don’t behave similarly toward Eliezer with respect to his position on TORTURE vs SPECKS because that topic is even more fictional?
Is this a constructive point, or just more gesturing?
As for the rest of your comment: Thank you! This is the discussion I wanted to be reading all along. Aside from a general feeling that you’re still not really trying to be fair, my remaining points are mercifully non-meta. To dampen political distractions, I’ll refer to the nuke-holding country as H, and a nuke-developing country as D.
You’re very focused on Wei Dai’s statement about backward induction, but I think you’re missing a key point: His strategy does not depend on D reasoning the way he expects them to, it’s just heavily optimized for this outcome. I believe he’s right to say that backward induction should convince D to comply, in the sense that it is in their own best interest to do so.
Don’t see how this follows. If both countries precommit, D gets bombed until it halts or otherwise cannot continue development. While this is not H’s preferred outcome, H’s entire strategy is predicated on weighing irreversible nuclear proliferation and its consequences more heavily than the millions of lives lost in the event of a suicidal failure to comply. In other words, D doesn’t wield sufficient power in this scenario to affect H’s decision, while H holds sufficient power to skew local incentives toward mutually beneficial outcomes.
Speaking of nuclear proliferation and its consequences, you’ve been pretty silent on this topic considering that preventing proliferation is the entire motivation for Wei Dai’s strategy. Talking about “murdering millions” without at least framing it alongside the horror of proliferation is not productive.
Practical considerations like this strike me as by far the best arguments against extreme, theory-heavy strategies. Messy real-world noise can easily make a high-stakes gambit more trouble than it’s worth.
It is a gesture concluding a constructive point.
This is a distinction without a difference. If H bombs D, H has lost (and D has lost more).
That depends on who precommits “first”. That’s a problematic concept for rational actors who have plenty of time to model each others’ possible strategies in advance of taking action. If H, without even being informed of it by D, considers this possible precommitment strategy of D, is it still rational for H to persist and threaten D anyway? Or perhaps H can precommit to ignoring such a precommitment by D? Or should D already have anticipated H’s original threat and backed down in advance of the threat ever having been made? I am reminded of the Forbidden Topic. Counterfactual blackmail isn’t just for superintelligences. As I asked before, does the decision theory exist yet to handle self-modifying agents modelling themselves and others, demonstrating how real actions can arise from this seething mass of virtual possibilities?
Then also, in what you dismiss as “messy real-world noise”, there may be a lot of other things D might do, such as fomenting insurrection in H, or sharing their research with every other country besides H (and blaming foreign spies), or assassinating H’s leader, or doing any and all of these while overtly appearing to back down.
The moment H makes that threat, the whole world is H’s enemy. H has declared a war that it hopes to win by the mere possession of overwhelming force.
I look around at the world since WWII and fail to see this horror. I look at Wei Dai’s strategy and see the horror. loqi remarked about Everett branches, but imagining the measure of the wave function where the Cold War ended with nuclear conflagration fails to convince me of anything.
This assumption determines (or at least greatly alters) the debate, and you need to make a better case for it. If H really “loses” by bombing D (meaning H considers this outcome less preferable than proliferation), then H’s threat is not credible, and the strategy breaks down, no exotic decision theory necessary. Looks like a crucial difference to me.
This entire paragraph depends on the above assumption. If I grant you that assumption and (artificially) hold constant H’s intent to precommit, then we’ve entered the realm of bluffing, and yes, the game tree gets pathological.
My mention of Everett branches was an indirect (and counter-productive) way of accusing you of hindsight bias.
Your talk of “convincing you” is distractingly binary. Do you admit that the severity and number of close calls in the Cold War is relevant to this discussion, and that these are positively correlated with the underlying justification for Wei Dai’s strategy? (Not necessarily its feasibility!)
Let’s set aside scale and comparisons for a moment, because your position looks suspiciously one-sided. You fail to see the horror of nuclear proliferation? If I may ask, what is your estimate for the probability that a nuclear weapon will be deployed in the next 100 years? Did you even ask yourself this question, or are you just selectively attending to the low-probability horrors of Wei Dai’s strategy?
Emphasis mine. You are compromised. Please take a deep breath (really!) and re-read my comment. I was not dismissing your point in the slightest, I was in fact stating my belief that it exemplified a class of particularly effective counter-arguments in this context.