A charismatic figure emerges to lead a new populist movement, focusing on opposition to the existing political system and its “elites”.
Eventually, average people become dissatisfied with the existing democratic government or leader. Possible reasons range from corruption, to scandals, to economic decline, to a hostile press. As of 2023, most leaders of developed countries have poor approval ratings; opinions vary on whether this is because of changes in the media landscape, or whether society overall just sucks more than it used to.
In the next election, ordinary people vote for the new populist movement and its leader, and they win democratically.
Once in power, the new leadership uses state institutions to slowly, one piece at a time, give themselves electoral advantages. They gerrymander districts, take over the media, punish any opposition, and purge or abolish outside institutions or checks on their authority (courts, electoral commissions, local governments, etc.), until democracy is gone.
I’m not sure I follow how this model applies to the examples you give later. In France especially, as you show on the graph, the far-right movement, which hasn’t seized power (yet), was already there 50 years ago, and already had a big electoral share 35 years ago. So even if it wins the presidential election in 2027, it is not a “new populist movement” as you put it. Even the current leader of the movement (Marine Lepen, I don’t know if she is a charmismatic figure) is the daugther of the founder of the movement.
For Italy, you cut the graph at 2008, which may mislead the reader to believe that the share of far-right in italy went from 0 in 2003 to almost 40% in 2023, (which is already 20 years, but faster than France I guess). This is not true. Looking at the composition of the italian parliement on wikipedia, there was already 17% of far-right in italy in 1994 (110/630), then it kind of declined and was replaced by a new movement. Actually, I cut the graph in 1994 but, if you go on the page, there has always been between 5% and 10% of far-right in the parliement in Italy since WWII (with a litteral fascit party until 1992).
I haven’t checked every other example, but rather than a new party with a charismatic figure, it seems to me that far-right parties are rising slowly and over time.
I’m not sure I follow how this model applies to the examples you give later. In France especially, as you show on the graph, the far-right movement, which hasn’t seized power (yet), was already there 50 years ago, and already had a big electoral share 35 years ago. So even if it wins the presidential election in 2027, it is not a “new populist movement” as you put it. Even the current leader of the movement (Marine Lepen, I don’t know if she is a charmismatic figure) is the daugther of the founder of the movement.
For Italy, you cut the graph at 2008, which may mislead the reader to believe that the share of far-right in italy went from 0 in 2003 to almost 40% in 2023, (which is already 20 years, but faster than France I guess). This is not true. Looking at the composition of the italian parliement on wikipedia, there was already 17% of far-right in italy in 1994 (110/630), then it kind of declined and was replaced by a new movement. Actually, I cut the graph in 1994 but, if you go on the page, there has always been between 5% and 10% of far-right in the parliement in Italy since WWII (with a litteral fascit party until 1992).
I haven’t checked every other example, but rather than a new party with a charismatic figure, it seems to me that far-right parties are rising slowly and over time.