I think I practice something similar to this with selfishness: a load-bearing part of my epistemic rationality is having it feel acceptable that I sometimes (!) do things for selfish rather than altruistic reasons.
You can make yourself feel that selfish acts are unacceptable and hope this will make you very altruistic and not very selfish, but in practice it also makes you come up with delusional justifications as to why selfish acts are in fact altruistic.
From an impartial standpoint we can ask how much of the latter is woth it for how much of the former. I think one of life’s repeated lessons is that sacrificing your epistemics for instrumental reasons is almost always a bad idea.
I think I practice something similar to this with selfishness: a load-bearing part of my epistemic rationality is having it feel acceptable that I sometimes (!) do things for selfish rather than altruistic reasons.
You can make yourself feel that selfish acts are unacceptable and hope this will make you very altruistic and not very selfish, but in practice it also makes you come up with delusional justifications as to why selfish acts are in fact altruistic.
From an impartial standpoint we can ask how much of the latter is woth it for how much of the former. I think one of life’s repeated lessons is that sacrificing your epistemics for instrumental reasons is almost always a bad idea.