I think it’s worth pointing out that from the POV of such ethical views, non-extinction could be an existential risk relative to extinction, or otherwise not that important (see also the asymmetric views in Thomas, 2022). If we assign some credence to those views, then we might instead focus more of our resources on avoiding harms without also (significantly) increasing extinction risks, perhaps especially reducing s-risks or the torture of sentient beings.
Furthermore, the more we reduce the risks of such harms, the less prone deontological (and other morally asymmetric) AI could be to aim for extinction.
I think it’s worth pointing out that from the POV of such ethical views, non-extinction could be an existential risk relative to extinction, or otherwise not that important (see also the asymmetric views in Thomas, 2022). If we assign some credence to those views, then we might instead focus more of our resources on avoiding harms without also (significantly) increasing extinction risks, perhaps especially reducing s-risks or the torture of sentient beings.
Furthermore, the more we reduce the risks of such harms, the less prone deontological (and other morally asymmetric) AI could be to aim for extinction.