I’m not sure you insist of calling this combination “physicalism”, contra all those discussions of physicalism in philosophy. First, one can be empiricist and scientific realist, and not be physicalist. For example there is nothing contradictory in thinking that the all the beliefs are revisable in the light of new empirical data, and also believe that sciences give us explanation of the real world, and still not believe that that the mental phenomena can be deduced from the physical facts. Of course you may be a physicalist, who also is scientific realist and Quinean empiricist, but it is good to keep on mind that those are not equal.
You point to the status of disciplines like math and logic, but it is not just that. Biologists and cognitive psychologists are scientists no? But they don’t have to have any particular belief of how the phenomena they research are related to the level of e.g. elementary particles.
I would point to what Caledonian said…
“What scientists DO presume is that the world can in some measure be described and understood.”
I think that nicely captures the science in general as not committed to a certain metaphysical view.
Q,
I’m not sure you insist of calling this combination “physicalism”, contra all those discussions of physicalism in philosophy. First, one can be empiricist and scientific realist, and not be physicalist. For example there is nothing contradictory in thinking that the all the beliefs are revisable in the light of new empirical data, and also believe that sciences give us explanation of the real world, and still not believe that that the mental phenomena can be deduced from the physical facts. Of course you may be a physicalist, who also is scientific realist and Quinean empiricist, but it is good to keep on mind that those are not equal.
You point to the status of disciplines like math and logic, but it is not just that. Biologists and cognitive psychologists are scientists no? But they don’t have to have any particular belief of how the phenomena they research are related to the level of e.g. elementary particles.
I would point to what Caledonian said… “What scientists DO presume is that the world can in some measure be described and understood.”
I think that nicely captures the science in general as not committed to a certain metaphysical view.