I feel like the suggested distinction between bayes and science is somewhat forced. Before I knew of bayes, I knew of Occam’s razor and its incredible role in science. I had always been under the impression that science favored simpler hypotheses. If it is suggested that we don’t see people rigorously adhering to bayes theorem when developing hypotheses, then the answer to why is not because science doesn’t value the simpler hypotheses suggested by bayes and priors, but because determining the simplest hypothesis is incredibly difficult to do in many cases. And this difficulty is acknowledged in the post. As is such, I’m not seeing science as diverging from bayes, the way its practiced is just a consequence of the admitted difficulty of finding the correct priors and determining the space of hypotheses.
I feel like the suggested distinction between bayes and science is somewhat forced. Before I knew of bayes, I knew of Occam’s razor and its incredible role in science. I had always been under the impression that science favored simpler hypotheses. If it is suggested that we don’t see people rigorously adhering to bayes theorem when developing hypotheses, then the answer to why is not because science doesn’t value the simpler hypotheses suggested by bayes and priors, but because determining the simplest hypothesis is incredibly difficult to do in many cases. And this difficulty is acknowledged in the post. As is such, I’m not seeing science as diverging from bayes, the way its practiced is just a consequence of the admitted difficulty of finding the correct priors and determining the space of hypotheses.