There’s a Bayesian-adjacent notion of closeness to the truth: observations narrow down the set of possible worlds, and two hypotheses that heavily overlap in the possible are “close”.
But the underlying notion of closeness to the truth is underdetermined. If we were relativistic beings, we’d privilege a different part of the observation set when comparing hypotheses, and Newtonian gravity wouldn’t feel close to the truth, it would feel obviously wrong and be rejected early (or more likely, never considered at all because we aren’t actually logically-omniscient Bayesians).
There’s a Bayesian-adjacent notion of closeness to the truth: observations narrow down the set of possible worlds, and two hypotheses that heavily overlap in the possible are “close”.
But the underlying notion of closeness to the truth is underdetermined. If we were relativistic beings, we’d privilege a different part of the observation set when comparing hypotheses, and Newtonian gravity wouldn’t feel close to the truth, it would feel obviously wrong and be rejected early (or more likely, never considered at all because we aren’t actually logically-omniscient Bayesians).