I note that EU maximization has this baggage of never strictly preferring a lottery over outcomes to the component outcomes, and you steelmen appear to me to not carry that baggage. I think that baggage is actually doing work in some people’s reasoning and intuitions.
I think you are referring to the case where an agent wishes to be unpredictable in an adversarial situation, right? (I genuinely do not feel confident I understand what you said.)
If so, isn’t this lottery on a different, let’s say ontological, level, instead of the level of “lotteries” that define its utility?
I note that EU maximization has this baggage of never strictly preferring a lottery over outcomes to the component outcomes, and you steelmen appear to me to not carry that baggage. I think that baggage is actually doing work in some people’s reasoning and intuitions.
Do you have any examples of this?
Hmm, examples are hard. Maybe the intuitions contribute to concept of edge instantiation?
I think you are referring to the case where an agent wishes to be unpredictable in an adversarial situation, right? (I genuinely do not feel confident I understand what you said.)
If so, isn’t this lottery on a different, let’s say ontological, level, instead of the level of “lotteries” that define its utility?