My reason for caring about internal computational states is: In the twin prisoners dilemma[1], I cooperate because we’re the same algorithm. If we modify the twin to have a slightly longer right index-finger-nail, I would still cooperate, even though they’re a different algorithm, but little enough has been changed about the algorithm that the internal states that they’re still similar enough.
But it could be that I’m in a prisoner’s dilemma with some program p⋆ that, given some inputs, returns the same outputs as I do, but for completely different “reasons”—that is, the internal states are very different, and a slight change in input would cause the output to be radically different. My logical correlation with p⋆ is pretty small, because, even though it gives the same output, it gives that output for very different reasons, so I don’t have much control over its outputs by controlling my own computations.
My reason for caring about internal computational states is: In the twin prisoners dilemma[1], I cooperate because we’re the same algorithm. If we modify the twin to have a slightly longer right index-finger-nail, I would still cooperate, even though they’re a different algorithm, but little enough has been changed about the algorithm that the internal states that they’re still similar enough.
But it could be that I’m in a prisoner’s dilemma with some program p⋆ that, given some inputs, returns the same outputs as I do, but for completely different “reasons”—that is, the internal states are very different, and a slight change in input would cause the output to be radically different. My logical correlation with p⋆ is pretty small, because, even though it gives the same output, it gives that output for very different reasons, so I don’t have much control over its outputs by controlling my own computations.
At least, that’s how I understand it.
Is this actually ECL, or just acausal trade?