Instead of saying that you care about simpler universes more, couldn’t a similar preference arise out of pure utilitarianism? Simpler universes would be more important because things that happen within them will be more likely to also happen within more complicated universes that end up creating a similar series of states. For every universe, isn’t there an infinite number of more complicated universes that end up with the simpler universe existing within part of it?
In order to make claims like that, you have to put a measure on your multiverse. I do not like doing that for three reasons:
1) It feels arbitrary. I do not think the essence of reality relies on something chunky like a Turing machine.
2) It limits the multiverse to be some set of worlds that I can put a measure on. The collection of all mathematical structures is not a set, and I think the multiverse should be at least that big.
3) It requires some sort inherent measure that is outside of the any of the individual universes in the multiverse. It is simpler to imagine that there is just every possible universe, with no inherent way to compare them.
However, regardless of those very personal beliefs, I think that the argument of simpler universes show up in more other universes does not actually answer any questions. You are trying to explain why you have a measure which makes simpler universes more likely by starting with a collection of universes in which the simpler ones are more likely, and observing that the simple ones are run more. This just walks you in circles.
I guess what I’m saying is that since simpler ones are run more, they are more important. That would be true if every simulation was individually important, but I think one thing about this is that the mathematical entity itself is important, regardless of the number of times it’s instituted. But it still intuitively feels as though there would be more “weight” to the ones run more often. Things that happen in such universes would have more “influence” over reality as a whole.
I am saying that in order to make the claim “simple universes are run more,” you first need the claim that “most universes are more likely to run simple simulations than complex simulations.” In order to make that second claim, you need to start with a measure of what “most universes” means, which you do using simplicity. (Most universes run simple simulations more because running simple simulations is simpler.)
I think there is a circular logic there that you cannot get past.
Another thought: Wouldn’t one of the simplest universes be a universal turing machine that runs through every possible
tape? All other universes would be contained within this universes, making them all “simple.”
Simple things can contain more complex things. The reason the more complex thing can be more complex is that it takes extra bits to specify what part of the simple thing to look at.
What I mean though, is that the more complicated universes can’t be less significant, because they are contained within this simple universe. All universes would have to be at least as morally significant as this universe, would they not?
I’m not following you here. I think Raiden has a valid point: we should shape the utility function so that Boltzmann brains don’t dominate utility computations. The meta-framework for utility you constructed remains perfectly valid, it’s just that the “local” utility of each universe has to be constructed with care (which is true about other meta-frameworks as well). E.g. we shouldn’t assigned a utility of Graham’s number of utilons to a universe just because it contains a Graham’s number of Boltzmann brains: it’s Pascal mugging.
Maybe we should start with a bounded utility function...
I am not sure if Raiden’s intended point is the same as what you are saying here. If it is, then you can just ignore my other comment, it was arguing with a position nobody held.
I absolutely agree. The local utility of each universe does have to be constructed with care.
I also have strong feelings that all utility functions are bounded.
I was imagining one utility function for the multiverse, but perhaps that does not make sense. (since the collection of universes might not be a set)
Perhaps the best way to model the utility function in my philosophy might be to have a separate utility function for each universe, and a simplicity exchange rate between them.
Instead of saying that you care about simpler universes more, couldn’t a similar preference arise out of pure utilitarianism? Simpler universes would be more important because things that happen within them will be more likely to also happen within more complicated universes that end up creating a similar series of states. For every universe, isn’t there an infinite number of more complicated universes that end up with the simpler universe existing within part of it?
In order to make claims like that, you have to put a measure on your multiverse. I do not like doing that for three reasons:
1) It feels arbitrary. I do not think the essence of reality relies on something chunky like a Turing machine.
2) It limits the multiverse to be some set of worlds that I can put a measure on. The collection of all mathematical structures is not a set, and I think the multiverse should be at least that big.
3) It requires some sort inherent measure that is outside of the any of the individual universes in the multiverse. It is simpler to imagine that there is just every possible universe, with no inherent way to compare them.
However, regardless of those very personal beliefs, I think that the argument of simpler universes show up in more other universes does not actually answer any questions. You are trying to explain why you have a measure which makes simpler universes more likely by starting with a collection of universes in which the simpler ones are more likely, and observing that the simple ones are run more. This just walks you in circles.
I guess what I’m saying is that since simpler ones are run more, they are more important. That would be true if every simulation was individually important, but I think one thing about this is that the mathematical entity itself is important, regardless of the number of times it’s instituted. But it still intuitively feels as though there would be more “weight” to the ones run more often. Things that happen in such universes would have more “influence” over reality as a whole.
I am saying that in order to make the claim “simple universes are run more,” you first need the claim that “most universes are more likely to run simple simulations than complex simulations.” In order to make that second claim, you need to start with a measure of what “most universes” means, which you do using simplicity. (Most universes run simple simulations more because running simple simulations is simpler.)
I think there is a circular logic there that you cannot get past.
Another thought: Wouldn’t one of the simplest universes be a universal turing machine that runs through every possible tape? All other universes would be contained within this universes, making them all “simple.”
Simple things can contain more complex things. The reason the more complex thing can be more complex is that it takes extra bits to specify what part of the simple thing to look at.
What I mean though, is that the more complicated universes can’t be less significant, because they are contained within this simple universe. All universes would have to be at least as morally significant as this universe, would they not?
If I have have a world containing many people, I can say that the world is more morally significant than any of the individual people.
I’m not following you here. I think Raiden has a valid point: we should shape the utility function so that Boltzmann brains don’t dominate utility computations. The meta-framework for utility you constructed remains perfectly valid, it’s just that the “local” utility of each universe has to be constructed with care (which is true about other meta-frameworks as well). E.g. we shouldn’t assigned a utility of Graham’s number of utilons to a universe just because it contains a Graham’s number of Boltzmann brains: it’s Pascal mugging.
Maybe we should start with a bounded utility function...
I am not sure if Raiden’s intended point is the same as what you are saying here. If it is, then you can just ignore my other comment, it was arguing with a position nobody held.
I absolutely agree. The local utility of each universe does have to be constructed with care.
I also have strong feelings that all utility functions are bounded.
I was imagining one utility function for the multiverse, but perhaps that does not make sense. (since the collection of universes might not be a set)
Perhaps the best way to model the utility function in my philosophy might be to have a separate utility function for each universe, and a simplicity exchange rate between them.