It’s a datum (which any adequate metaethical theory must account for) that there can be substantive moral disagreement. When Bob says “Abortion is wrong”, and Sally says, “No it isn’t”, they are disagreeing with each other.
I wonder though: is this any more mysterious than a case where two children are arguing over whether strawberry or chocolate ice cream is better?
In that case, we would happily say that the disagreement comes from their false belief that it’s a deep fact about the universe which ice cream is better. If Eliezer is right (I’m still agnostic about this), wouldn’t moral disagreements be explained in an analogous way?
It’s a datum (which any adequate metaethical theory must account for) that there can be substantive moral disagreement. When Bob says “Abortion is wrong”, and Sally says, “No it isn’t”, they are disagreeing with each other.
I wonder though: is this any more mysterious than a case where two children are arguing over whether strawberry or chocolate ice cream is better?
In that case, we would happily say that the disagreement comes from their false belief that it’s a deep fact about the universe which ice cream is better. If Eliezer is right (I’m still agnostic about this), wouldn’t moral disagreements be explained in an analogous way?