Evil is a pattern of of behavior exhibited by agents. In embedded agents, that pattern is absolutely represented by material. As for what that pattern is, evil agents harm others for their own gain. That seems to be the core of “evilness” in possibility space. Whenever I try to think of the most evil actions I can, they tend to correlate with harming others (especially one’s equals, or one’s inner circle, who would expect mutual cooperation), for one’s own gain. Hamlet’s uncle. Domestic abusers. Executives who ruin lives for profit. Politicians who hand out public money in exchange for bribes. Bullies who torment other children for fun. It’s a learnable script, which says “I can gain at others expense”, whether that gain is power, control, money, or just pleasure.
If your philosopher thinks “evil” is immaterial, does he also think “epistemology” is immaterial?
(I apologize if this sounds argumentative, I’ve just heard “good and evil are social constructs” far too many times.)
Evil is a pattern of of behavior exhibited by agents. In embedded agents, that pattern is absolutely represented by material. As for what that pattern is, evil agents harm others for their own gain. That seems to be the core of “evilness” in possibility space. Whenever I try to think of the most evil actions I can, they tend to correlate with harming others (especially one’s equals, or one’s inner circle, who would expect mutual cooperation), for one’s own gain. Hamlet’s uncle. Domestic abusers. Executives who ruin lives for profit. Politicians who hand out public money in exchange for bribes. Bullies who torment other children for fun. It’s a learnable script, which says “I can gain at others expense”, whether that gain is power, control, money, or just pleasure.
If your philosopher thinks “evil” is immaterial, does he also think “epistemology” is immaterial?
(I apologize if this sounds argumentative, I’ve just heard “good and evil are social constructs” far too many times.)