1. In this whole series of posts you are silently presupposing that utilitarianism is the only rational system of ethics. Which is strange, because if people have different utility functions Arrow’s impossibility theorem makes it impossible to arrive at a “rational” (in this blogs bayesian-consistent abuse of the term) aggregate utility function. So irrationality is not only rational but the only rational option. Funny what people will sell as overcoming bias.
2. In this particular case the introductory example fails, because 1 killing != − 1 saving. Removing a drowning man from the pool is obviously better then merely abstaining from drowning an other man in the pool.
3. The feeling of superiority over all those biased proles is a bias. In fact it is very obviously among your main biases and consequently one you should spend a disproportional amount of resources on overcoming.
Removing a drowning man from the pool is obviously better then merely abstaining from drowning an other man in the pool.
I don’t think it’s obvious. Thought experiment: Steve is killing Ann by drowning, and Beth is about to drown by accident nearby. I have a cell phone connection open to Steve, and I have time to either convince Steve to stop drowning Ann, or to convince Steve to save Beth but still drown Ann. It is not obvious to me that I should choose the latter option.
Do you mean to assert that choosing the latter option in your scenario and the former option in Salutator’s scenario is inconsistent?
If so, you might want to unpack your thinking a little more, as I don’t follow it. What you’ve described in your thought experiment isn’t a choice between rescuing a drowning person and abstaining from drowning a person, and the difference seems potentially important.
The options I’m choosing between are Steve rescuing a drowning person and Steve abstaining from drowning a person. If one of those options is obviously better than the other, then the same relationship should hold when I can choose Steve’s actions rather than my own.
Ah! Either I can convince Steve to stop drowning Ann, or [convince Steve to] save Beth. I get it now. I had read it as either I can convince Steve to stop drowning Ann, or [I can] save Beth. Thanks for the clarification… I’d been genuinely confused.
1. In this whole series of posts you are silently presupposing that utilitarianism is the only rational system of ethics. Which is strange, because if people have different utility functions Arrow’s impossibility theorem makes it impossible to arrive at a “rational” (in this blogs bayesian-consistent abuse of the term) aggregate utility function. So irrationality is not only rational but the only rational option. Funny what people will sell as overcoming bias.
2. In this particular case the introductory example fails, because 1 killing != − 1 saving. Removing a drowning man from the pool is obviously better then merely abstaining from drowning an other man in the pool.
3. The feeling of superiority over all those biased proles is a bias. In fact it is very obviously among your main biases and consequently one you should spend a disproportional amount of resources on overcoming.
I don’t think it’s obvious. Thought experiment: Steve is killing Ann by drowning, and Beth is about to drown by accident nearby. I have a cell phone connection open to Steve, and I have time to either convince Steve to stop drowning Ann, or to convince Steve to save Beth but still drown Ann. It is not obvious to me that I should choose the latter option.
Do you mean to assert that choosing the latter option in your scenario and the former option in Salutator’s scenario is inconsistent?
If so, you might want to unpack your thinking a little more, as I don’t follow it. What you’ve described in your thought experiment isn’t a choice between rescuing a drowning person and abstaining from drowning a person, and the difference seems potentially important.
The options I’m choosing between are Steve rescuing a drowning person and Steve abstaining from drowning a person. If one of those options is obviously better than the other, then the same relationship should hold when I can choose Steve’s actions rather than my own.
Ah!
Either I can convince Steve to stop drowning Ann, or [convince Steve to] save Beth.
I get it now.
I had read it as either I can convince Steve to stop drowning Ann, or [I can] save Beth.
Thanks for the clarification… I’d been genuinely confused.
I’ve edited it to hopefully make it unambiguous—I hope no one reads that as Steve convincing himself.