“(...) war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when they are weak. It is then that tyrants are tempted.”—Ronald Reagan
NATO faces its gravest military disadvantage since 1949, as the balance of power has shifted decisively toward its adversaries in the Era of Drone Warfare. The speed and scale of NATO’s relative military decline represents the most dramatic power shift since World War II—and the alliance appears dangerously unaware of its new vulnerability
Economic logic of drone warfare: In Ukraine, drones account for over 70% of combat kills—a proportion likely to increase. The economics are devastating: $1,000 FPV drones routinely destroy $7 million Abrams tanks. Modern tanks are dangerously outdated and the entire armored warfare needs to be redesigned from the ground up to face the realities of modern drone warfare.
Lack of military experience: NATO lacks both experienced drone operators and institutional knowledge of drone warfare. The alliance has no significant combat experience fighting against and integrating drones at scale.
Lack of drone production: NATO’s drone capabilities are shockingly inadequate. The UK army possessed fewer than 450 FPV drones as of August 2024, while a single Ukrainian factory produces 40,000 monthly. Both Russia and Ukraine now manufacture 3-5 million drones annually.
What A Genuine Drone-Aware Doctrine Actually Looks Like
The best video on the realities of the modern drone-dominated battlefield is here. Unfortunately, it got removed from YouTube for being Russian propaganda.[1]
Dozens of drones per human soldier Victory requires millions of drones monthly, not hundreds. A dozen or a hundred of drones per human soldier. Doctrine must prioritize massive drone manufacturing capacity, advanced battery technology, and supply chains measured in millions of units.Majority of military budget should eventually go to autonomous platforms.
Tanks, Navy, Infantry doctrine need to be redesigned from the ground up: Tanks need complete redesign—active protection systems, anti-drone cages, complete top armor. Infantry need to be trained differently, moving in smaller units, under constant drone overwatch, skirting in and out of quickly made drone-proof bunkers and using ground drones for logistics to minimize exposure. Navy should transition from few expensive carriers to distributed drone-launching platforms—hundreds of cheap drone carriers, underwater drone deployments, and autonomous loyal wingmen for the naval air-force.
The Transparent Battlefield: Assume constant observation. Every movement is tracked, every concentration targeted within minutes. Forces must operate dispersed, communicating through secure mesh networks, moving constantly. Resources, command, logistics—everything dispersed, redundant, modular.
Electronic Warfare Centrality: Every unit needs electronic warfare capability. But this is temporary: AI-enabled autonomous drones that operate without communication links are coming. Doctrine must prepare for both current jamming-dependent warfare and future jamming-proof autonomous swarms.
Beyond the drone revolution, China is in acscension.
Industrial supremacy: China dominates global production in critical military technologies—controlling the majority of the world’s drone manufacturing, shipbuilding capacity, battery production as well as a host of other critical dual-use technologies.
Technology parity: China has successfully replicated fifth-generation fighter capabilities (notably copying JSF technology through espionage) and is now mass-producing these aircraft at scale. In fact, they have leaped ahead of the US Air Force fielding the first 6th generation fighter prototypes.
Obsolence of US Navy doctrine: Aircraft carriers—long the cornerstone of Western power projection—are increasingly vulnerable to drone swarms and hypersonic missiles, probably rendering the doctrine of carrier battle groups obsolete.
Eroding advantages: Traditional US strengths—submarine superiority, stealth bomber fleets, control of sea routes— also face fairly rapid erosion with China quickly catching up.
FAQ: The Unrecognized Scale of NATO’s Military Disadvantage
Q: Isn’t NATO aware of these problems? Surely military leaders see what’s happening in Ukraine?
A: Yes, NATO officials acknowledge drone warfare’s importance and announce modernization programs regularly. But awareness and action are vastly different things.
They’re ordering thousands of drones when they need millions, updating doctrine paragraphs when they need to rewrite entire manuals. Moreover many modernization programs are very slow or never materialize at all. The official [often optimistic!] timelines for acquiring the most minimal amount of drones for most NATO forces is often on the order of years.
Q: But NATO is increasing defense spending and modernizing forces. Isn’t that enough?
A: NATO’s response resembles rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Member states are buying more tanks that drones will destroy, more fighters that can’t engage drone swarms, and investing in traditional platforms that are already obsolete. The UK’s 450 FPV drones versus Ukraine’s millions tells you everything. NATO is spending more money on the wrong things, guided by doctrine written before the drone revolution. It’s not about spending—it’s about spending on what actually matters in modern warfare. Modern drone warfare means one should have dozens of drones for every human soldier. Tanks and other mechanized divisions needs to be redesigned from the ground up.
Q: Why can’t NATO just learn from Ukraine’s experience?
A: Military transformation takes years. Critically, adaptation requires purging peacetime leadership and promoting combat-tested officers.
Peacetime commanders, promoted through political skill rather than battlefield success, psychologically have trouble accepting that much of their expertise may be obsolete. Unlike Russia, which purged ineffective leaders through brutal battlefield selection, NATO’s command structure remains unchanged— the embarrassing reality is that NATO generals who haven’t seen combat against a peer adversary are lecturing battle-tested Ukrainian officers.
Q: Doesn’t NATO still have technological superiority? Better training?
A: These advantages matter less when the fundamental grammar of war has changed. Superior training in obsolete tactics is worthless. Technological superiority in traditional platforms means little when a $1,000 drone defeats a $7 million tank.
NATO is dangerously unaware that its military edge is slipping
“(...) war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when they are weak. It is then that tyrants are tempted.”—Ronald Reagan
NATO faces its gravest military disadvantage since 1949, as the balance of power has shifted decisively toward its adversaries in the Era of Drone Warfare. The speed and scale of NATO’s relative military decline represents the most dramatic power shift since World War II—and the alliance appears dangerously unaware of its new vulnerability
NATO doctrine is dangerously obsolete
The Pax Americana is coming to its end.
Failure to defeat Houthi Rebels: The US Navy’s struggles against the Houthis’ low-cost drone arsenal demonstrate how even non-state actors can challenge NATO air defense. NATO forces found themselves hard-pressed to counter relatively primitive drone attacks.
Economic logic of drone warfare: In Ukraine, drones account for over 70% of combat kills—a proportion likely to increase. The economics are devastating: $1,000 FPV drones routinely destroy $7 million Abrams tanks. Modern tanks are dangerously outdated and the entire armored warfare needs to be redesigned from the ground up to face the realities of modern drone warfare.
Lack of military experience: NATO lacks both experienced drone operators and institutional knowledge of drone warfare. The alliance has no significant combat experience fighting against and integrating drones at scale.
Lack of NATO anti-drone air defense: NATO’s air defense systems, designed for traditional threats, cannot effectively counter drone swarms. Russian drones have repeatedly penetrated Polish and Western European airspace, with NATO struggling to detect, track, and neutralize these incursions.
Lack of drone production: NATO’s drone capabilities are shockingly inadequate. The UK army possessed fewer than 450 FPV drones as of August 2024, while a single Ukrainian factory produces 40,000 monthly. Both Russia and Ukraine now manufacture 3-5 million drones annually.
″ At the start of the war a 1000 drones was a lot. Now a single assembly line can produce 40,000 drones a month”
A quick Google states that Ukraine produces about 4000 FPV drones a day. Alarmingly, the same Google search revealed that the total procurement of FPV drones at this moment by the British army is 450 FPV drones! Western militaries are completely asleep at the wheel.
The most problematic is
Obsolescence of NATO doctrine: NATO’s military doctrine remains rooted in pre-drone warfare assumptions, creating an embarrassing disconnect where peacetime generals lecture battle-hardened Ukrainian officers who possess actual combat experience against a lethal, drone-equipped adversary.
What A Genuine Drone-Aware Doctrine Actually Looks Like
The best video on the realities of the modern drone-dominated battlefield is here. Unfortunately, it got removed from YouTube for being Russian propaganda.[1]
Dozens of drones per human soldier
Victory requires millions of drones monthly, not hundreds. A dozen or a hundred of drones per human soldier. Doctrine must prioritize massive drone manufacturing capacity, advanced battery technology, and supply chains measured in millions of units. Majority of military budget should eventually go to autonomous platforms.
Tanks, Navy, Infantry doctrine need to be redesigned from the ground up: Tanks need complete redesign—active protection systems, anti-drone cages, complete top armor. Infantry need to be trained differently, moving in smaller units, under constant drone overwatch, skirting in and out of quickly made drone-proof bunkers and using ground drones for logistics to minimize exposure. Navy should transition from few expensive carriers to distributed drone-launching platforms—hundreds of cheap drone carriers, underwater drone deployments, and autonomous loyal wingmen for the naval air-force.
The Transparent Battlefield: Assume constant observation. Every movement is tracked, every concentration targeted within minutes. Forces must operate dispersed, communicating through secure mesh networks, moving constantly. Resources, command, logistics—everything dispersed, redundant, modular.
Electronic Warfare Centrality: Every unit needs electronic warfare capability. But this is temporary: AI-enabled autonomous drones that operate without communication links are coming. Doctrine must prepare for both current jamming-dependent warfare and future jamming-proof autonomous swarms.
China’s Strategic Advantages
[For a more in-depth discussion I recommend my earlier shortform on the military realities of the coming Taiwan crisis.]
Beyond the drone revolution, China is in acscension.
Industrial supremacy: China dominates global production in critical military technologies—controlling the majority of the world’s drone manufacturing, shipbuilding capacity, battery production as well as a host of other critical dual-use technologies.
Technology parity: China has successfully replicated fifth-generation fighter capabilities (notably copying JSF technology through espionage) and is now mass-producing these aircraft at scale. In fact, they have leaped ahead of the US Air Force fielding the first 6th generation fighter prototypes.
Obsolence of US Navy doctrine: Aircraft carriers—long the cornerstone of Western power projection—are increasingly vulnerable to drone swarms and hypersonic missiles, probably rendering the doctrine of carrier battle groups obsolete.
Eroding advantages: Traditional US strengths—submarine superiority, stealth bomber fleets, control of sea routes— also face fairly rapid erosion with China quickly catching up.
FAQ: The Unrecognized Scale of NATO’s Military Disadvantage
Q: Isn’t NATO aware of these problems? Surely military leaders see what’s happening in Ukraine?
A: Yes, NATO officials acknowledge drone warfare’s importance and announce modernization programs regularly. But awareness and action are vastly different things.
They’re ordering thousands of drones when they need millions, updating doctrine paragraphs when they need to rewrite entire manuals. Moreover many modernization programs are very slow or never materialize at all. The official [often optimistic!] timelines for acquiring the most minimal amount of drones for most NATO forces is often on the order of years.
Q: But NATO is increasing defense spending and modernizing forces. Isn’t that enough?
A: NATO’s response resembles rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Member states are buying more tanks that drones will destroy, more fighters that can’t engage drone swarms, and investing in traditional platforms that are already obsolete. The UK’s 450 FPV drones versus Ukraine’s millions tells you everything. NATO is spending more money on the wrong things, guided by doctrine written before the drone revolution. It’s not about spending—it’s about spending on what actually matters in modern warfare. Modern drone warfare means one should have dozens of drones for every human soldier. Tanks and other mechanized divisions needs to be redesigned from the ground up.
Q: Why can’t NATO just learn from Ukraine’s experience?
A: Military transformation takes years. Critically, adaptation requires purging peacetime leadership and promoting combat-tested officers.
Peacetime commanders, promoted through political skill rather than battlefield success, psychologically have trouble accepting that much of their expertise may be obsolete. Unlike Russia, which purged ineffective leaders through brutal battlefield selection, NATO’s command structure remains unchanged— the embarrassing reality is that NATO generals who haven’t seen combat against a peer adversary are lecturing battle-tested Ukrainian officers.
Q: Doesn’t NATO still have technological superiority? Better training?
A: These advantages matter less when the fundamental grammar of war has changed. Superior training in obsolete tactics is worthless. Technological superiority in traditional platforms means little when a $1,000 drone defeats a $7 million tank.
Which is true. It was Russian propaganda. But it is also the best source on what the West’s adversary is actually thinking and doing.