I’m reserved as to the corollary that only winning against the strongest advocate of an idea holds ANY meaning to disprove the idea.
For one, there could be a better arguer. If there is a better advocate of the intelligence explosion than Eliezer, unlikely as they may seem, who just won’t go public and keeps to private circles, would it do nothing to win against the former? Taken another step further, if it is likely there ever will be such a proponent, does that invalidate all present and past efforts?
For another, the quality of an arguer can only be made after they effect. So to have any standing on any idea, one must win against every single advocate of the opposing view. Has anyone here tried that on, say, theism?
I think it’s more accurate to say that winning an argument against sub-optimal advocates of an idea doesn’t give enough basis to discredit the idea reliably. Indeed, since in complicated issues there is often no advocate who can exhibit all arguments favoring a position, one cannot completely discredit the idea even after defeating the champion of advocates. This frame seems more Bayesian Rationalistic, too, as it does not deal with probabilities of 0 or 1.
I’m reserved as to the corollary that only winning against the strongest advocate of an idea holds ANY meaning to disprove the idea.
For one, there could be a better arguer. If there is a better advocate of the intelligence explosion than Eliezer, unlikely as they may seem, who just won’t go public and keeps to private circles, would it do nothing to win against the former? Taken another step further, if it is likely there ever will be such a proponent, does that invalidate all present and past efforts?
For another, the quality of an arguer can only be made after they effect. So to have any standing on any idea, one must win against every single advocate of the opposing view. Has anyone here tried that on, say, theism?
I think it’s more accurate to say that winning an argument against sub-optimal advocates of an idea doesn’t give enough basis to discredit the idea reliably. Indeed, since in complicated issues there is often no advocate who can exhibit all arguments favoring a position, one cannot completely discredit the idea even after defeating the champion of advocates. This frame seems more Bayesian Rationalistic, too, as it does not deal with probabilities of 0 or 1.