I agree with this. There are a lot of little clues like this pointing in one direction or the other. I think a lot of people have a learned helplessness about noticing and combating biases (both in themselves, and in other people), and that this results in people under-updating on local evidence that someone is more/less likely to be dissembling or deceiving themselves.
I’m dealing with cognitive processes in my environment that are frequently adversarial and trying to “cheat” (if only unconsciously), but I nonetheless have to be able to update on evidence against rationalization just as readily as evidence for rationalization. (And in my case, I have to try to consciously correct for tendencies like “I’m more likely to be sensitive to evidence of cheating, and insensitive to evidence of non-cheating, when the person claiming to be able to outperform feels low-status to me, or when it feels like they’re doing something socially risky.”)
I agree with this. There are a lot of little clues like this pointing in one direction or the other. I think a lot of people have a learned helplessness about noticing and combating biases (both in themselves, and in other people), and that this results in people under-updating on local evidence that someone is more/less likely to be dissembling or deceiving themselves.
I’m dealing with cognitive processes in my environment that are frequently adversarial and trying to “cheat” (if only unconsciously), but I nonetheless have to be able to update on evidence against rationalization just as readily as evidence for rationalization. (And in my case, I have to try to consciously correct for tendencies like “I’m more likely to be sensitive to evidence of cheating, and insensitive to evidence of non-cheating, when the person claiming to be able to outperform feels low-status to me, or when it feels like they’re doing something socially risky.”)