Nota Bene: Just so there’s no misunderstanding, neither materialism nor idealism need be metaphysical assumptions. Questions about materialism and idealism can be investigated via standard methods if we don’t presuppose them. It’s only that a correspondence theory of truth forces these to become metaphysical assumptions by making our notion of truth depend on assuming something about the nature of reality to ground our criterion of truth
Assuming what about the nature of reality? M/T and CToT only require that there is some sort of territory....they dont say anything specific about it. I can see how it would be a problem to make a 1) non-reviseable 2) apriori assumption, about 3) the nature of reality, ie. metaphysics.
But it’s not the “metaphysics” that’s the problem: the problem is mostly the “non-reviseable”. Like a lot of people, I don’t see a problem with reviseable assumptions.
And what are the “standard methods”? As far as I can see, the standard method for figuring the correct metaphysics of the territory is to infer it from the best known map, where “best” is based on empirical evidence, among other things. But if aposteriori/empirical reasoning is relevant to metaphysics, you don’t have to reject metaphysics along with your rejection of the apriori.
(I have my own problems with correspondence, but they are more to do with the fact that there is no way of checking correspondence per se).
I don’t think it’s a great choice, though, for a model of how truth-making happens, because as we’ve seen it depends on making unnecessary, metaphysical assumptions.
Unnecessary for whom, or for what purpose? If you only want to predict, and you don’t care about how prediction works, then maybe you can manage without metaphysics. But that depends on what your interests are, as an individual.
This lets us remove metaphysical claims about the nature of reality from our epistemology, and by the principle of parsimony we should because additional assumptions are liabilities that make it strictly more likely that we’re mistaken.
Again, M/T doesn’t require a lot of metaphysical claims. And parsimony isn’t supposed to tell you that nothing is real . Simply giving up on even trying to explain things isn’t parsimony. So a refusal to explain how prediction even works isn’t a parsimonious explanation of prediction, because it isn’t an explanation at all.
Assuming what about the nature of reality? M/T and CToT only require that there is some sort of territory....they dont say anything specific about it. I can see how it would be a problem to make a 1) non-reviseable 2) apriori assumption, about 3) the nature of reality, ie. metaphysics.
But it’s not the “metaphysics” that’s the problem: the problem is mostly the “non-reviseable”. Like a lot of people, I don’t see a problem with reviseable assumptions.
And what are the “standard methods”? As far as I can see, the standard method for figuring the correct metaphysics of the territory is to infer it from the best known map, where “best” is based on empirical evidence, among other things. But if aposteriori/empirical reasoning is relevant to metaphysics, you don’t have to reject metaphysics along with your rejection of the apriori.
(I have my own problems with correspondence, but they are more to do with the fact that there is no way of checking correspondence per se).
Unnecessary for whom, or for what purpose? If you only want to predict, and you don’t care about how prediction works, then maybe you can manage without metaphysics. But that depends on what your interests are, as an individual.
Again, M/T doesn’t require a lot of metaphysical claims. And parsimony isn’t supposed to tell you that nothing is real . Simply giving up on even trying to explain things isn’t parsimony. So a refusal to explain how prediction even works isn’t a parsimonious explanation of prediction, because it isn’t an explanation at all.