The fact that I know there is a future result which will happen based on my actions and state empowers me to act in the present, in order to have impact on the future.
The fact that your state, your actions are, and the results of your actions are all determined, means that you can’t impact the future in the sense of helping to bring about one non-inevitable future rather than another.
I “could” have chosen something else in the first case, too, in the ways I care about. C was a meaningful action, within my capabilities and in my consideration. I simply did not choose it; and consistently would not choose it every time I was put in the same world state.
Additionally, I “could not” have chosen something else in the second case, in the ways I care about. The random variation was not meaningfully under my control. Dice chose C for me as much as I chose C for me.
Edit: If you do happen to strongly prefer the second case, it is within your power to defer decisions you are uncertain about to the most likely sources of randomness/stochasticity in our universe: random numbers generated based on quantum fluctuations. Explicitly establish your probabilities for each option, then roll the dice.
I “could” have chosen something else in the first case
But not in reality. “Could”, not could.
The random variation was not meaningfully under my control
It’s true that you can’t pre-determine an internal dice roll as if you an extra-physical entity that controls the physical events in your brain, but deteminism doesnt give you that kind of control either. If you are your brain , the question is whether your brain has freedom, control , etc, not whether “you” control “it”, as if you were two separate entities. And as a physical self, basicaly identical to the brain, you can still exert after-the-fact control over an internal coin toss...filter or gatekeep it, as it were. The entire brain is not obliged to make a response based on a single deterministic neural event, so it’s not obliged to make a response based on a single indeterministic neural event.
I can filter or gatekeep as many deterministic neural events as I can indeterministic neural events. The main distinction from the perspective of me-as-a-complicated-function is that more stochastic noise in the lower levels gives me more slightly different (but, as you suggest, still coherent with ‘me’) results from running into very similar situations repeatedly. Which is … probably functionally helpful? But to the extent free will exists as emergent agency in the (partially!) indeterminate situation, it also exists in the deterministic situation, for the same reasons.
I can filter or gatekeep as many deterministic neural events as I can indeterministic neural events
Of course.
But to the extent free will exists as emergent agency in the (partially!) indeterminate situation, it also exists in the deterministic situation, for the same reasons.
No, because there is no longer the ability to have done otherwise.
The fact that your state, your actions are, and the results of your actions are all determined, means that you can’t impact the future in the sense of helping to bring about one non-inevitable future rather than another.
Yet I can impact the future in the sense of helping to bring about one inevitable future rather than something that will not happen.
But you can’t impact the future in any greater sense. You can call the two things by the same name, but they’re ni the same.
There is no “greater sense” granted by a lack of predictability.
If I have a 100% chance to generate A ⇒ B; or an 80% chance to generate A ⇒ B and 20% chance to generate A ⇒ C.
I’m not meaningfully choosing B more in the second option more than the first option. More the opposite.
Yes you are, because you could have chosen something else in the second case. A choice between one isn’t a choice
I “could” have chosen something else in the first case, too, in the ways I care about. C was a meaningful action, within my capabilities and in my consideration. I simply did not choose it; and consistently would not choose it every time I was put in the same world state.
Additionally, I “could not” have chosen something else in the second case, in the ways I care about. The random variation was not meaningfully under my control. Dice chose C for me as much as I chose C for me.
Edit: If you do happen to strongly prefer the second case, it is within your power to defer decisions you are uncertain about to the most likely sources of randomness/stochasticity in our universe: random numbers generated based on quantum fluctuations. Explicitly establish your probabilities for each option, then roll the dice.
But not in reality. “Could”, not could.
It’s true that you can’t pre-determine an internal dice roll as if you an extra-physical entity that controls the physical events in your brain, but deteminism doesnt give you that kind of control either. If you are your brain , the question is whether your brain has freedom, control , etc, not whether “you” control “it”, as if you were two separate entities. And as a physical self, basicaly identical to the brain, you can still exert after-the-fact control over an internal coin toss...filter or gatekeep it, as it were. The entire brain is not obliged to make a response based on a single deterministic neural event, so it’s not obliged to make a response based on a single indeterministic neural event.
I can filter or gatekeep as many deterministic neural events as I can indeterministic neural events. The main distinction from the perspective of me-as-a-complicated-function is that more stochastic noise in the lower levels gives me more slightly different (but, as you suggest, still coherent with ‘me’) results from running into very similar situations repeatedly. Which is … probably functionally helpful? But to the extent free will exists as emergent agency in the (partially!) indeterminate situation, it also exists in the deterministic situation, for the same reasons.
Of course.
No, because there is no longer the ability to have done otherwise.